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INTRODUCTION
Few things ignite such heated passion in America as discussions
about baseball 2 or the United States' international relations with
2. See Joseph A. Kohm, Jr., Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: It's Going, Go-
ing... Gone!, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1231, 1231-32 (1996) (discussing the importance
of baseball to American society and the effect of repealing baseball's antitrust ex-
emption). Baseball's importance to American society recently enjoyed a rebirth
due to the heroics of the 1998 season. See Tim Kurkjian, Baseball's Back, From A
to Z, (last modified Feb. 2, 1999) <http://espn.go.com/mlb/features/
01063410.html> (listing twenty-six alphabetical reasons why MLB experienced a
renaissance during the 1998 season); cf William Gildea, McGwire's Life Is A Bro-
ken Record: 'Magical Year' Took Its Toll On Home-Run Hitting Legend, WASH.
POST, Feb. 25, 1999, at D8 (explaining the pressure and intense scrutiny that Mark
McGwire faced during his single season home-run record setting year). Both Mark
McGwire's and Sammy Sosa's shattering of baseball's hallowed home run record,
and the New York Yankees' incredible 125-win World Championship season
brought back many fans who turned away from the game following the 1994
strike-shortened season. Kurkjian, supra. Historically, baseball embodies a unique
niche within American society and culture. Kohm, Jr., supra, at 1231. Baseball's
history provides a parallel to the developments in twentieth century American life,
including confrontations with class struggles, immigration, racism, and war. See id.
at 1231-32. Moreover, discussions and passions about baseball transcend the dif-
ferences of age, class, ethnicity, politics, and race, and provide a rapport to the
American experience. See id. at 1231.
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Cuba.' Recently, the Clinton Administration's proposal to ease the
3. See Alejandre v. Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1253 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (provid-
ing $187,627,911 in total compensatory and punitive damages for the families of
the Operation to the Rescue pilots, who were shot down by the Cuban government
on February 24, 1996); Alejandre v. Cuba, No. 96-10126, 96-10127, 96-1012,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4137, at *79 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 1999) (garnishing debt
owed to a Cuban telecommunications organization by American telecommunica-
tion companies for the families of the murdered Operation to the Rescue pilots
killed in 1996); see also Serge F. Kovaleski, Judge Uses Cuba Funds For Award:
Telephone Receipts Go To Flier's Families, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 1999, at A 10
(describing how the Alejandro District Court ruling infuriated the Castro govern-
ment and could further sour bilateral relations because of its potential effect on
previously authorized financial transactions between the two nations). In response
to Alejandre, the Cuban government filed suit against the United States. See People
of Cuba v. United States, (Havana Civ. & Admin. Ct., filed June 1, 1999) (visited
July 7, 1999)<http:llvww.gramna.cu/ingles/junio3/024-i.htmil> (explaining Cuba's
retaliatory $181.1 billion compensation claim for deaths and injuries allegedly
caused by the United States over the past forty years). In contrast to MLB's recent
renaissance, the Clinton Administration's recent proposals ignited discord among
many interested in the United States' policy towards Cuba. See Rafael Lorente,
Legislators Oppose Orioles-Cuba Baseball Gaines; Letter Seeks 'Solidaritv With
Cuban Workers,' SUN-SENTINEL, (Ft. Lauderdale), Jan. 22, 1999, at 9A, available
in LEXIS, News Library (discussing the vehement opposition of several Members
of Congress to the exhibition baseball games between the Baltimore Orioles and
the Cuban National Team). New Jersey Congressman Robert Menendez adamantly
claims that any dilution to the embargo signals the United States' insensitivity to
Cuba's poor labor and human rights record. See id.; see also Mireya Navarro, Mi-
ami's Generations of Exiles Side By Side, Yet Worlds Apart, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
1999, at A25 (illustrating the zealous and steadfast Cuban-American opposition
towards engaging Cuba, and its influence on the United States government). Many
Miami based Cuban exiles believe that relaxing the United States' embargo to-
wards Cuba would strengthen Castro's Communist regime. See id.; Roger E. Her-
nandez, Castro's American Fans, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1999, at A24 (identifying
the chasm existing between those in favor of lifting the United States' embargo
and the organized and vociferous opposition to any rapprochement with Cuba).
Hemandez condemns any relaxation of the United States' embargo as insensitive
towards the suffering of Cuban people, particularly because he claims it would be
changed in order to profit American businesses and bolster the egos of American
celebrities. See id. See generally PATRICK J. KIGER, SQUEEZE PLAY: THE UNITED
STATES, CUBA AND THE HELMS-BURTON ACT 76 (1997) (noting that since 1979,
individuals who lobbied on behalf of Cuban-American interests donated approxi-
mately $5 million in campaign contributions). Of these contributions, over $3.2
million came from high-ranking members of the Cuban American National Foun-
dation ["CANF"], in an effort to strengthen the embargo. See id. But see Thomas J.
Donohue, Market Foothold In Cuba, WASH. POST, July 26, 1999, at A 19 (ex-
plaining that the President and CEO of the United States Chamber of Commerce
desires to foster a private sector within Cuba as a way to promote democratic
changes). See also Anita Snow, Cuba Bishops Urge End to US Embargo, WASH.
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United States' trade embargo against Cuba4 thrust these two seem-
ingly diverse realms together,5 permitting exhibition games between
POST, Feb. 16, 1999, at A16 (relating the desire of North American Roman Catho-
lic bishops to end the United States' embargo against Cuba). The bishops seek to
build upon Pope John Paul's 1998 visit to Cuba to improve United States-Cuba
relations. See id.
4. See PROCLAMATION No. 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (1962) (explaining that
President Kennedy's establishment of a comprehensive economic embargo against
Cuba sought to promote security throughout the western hemisphere); see also
Lucien J. Dhooge, Fiddling With Fidel: An Analysis of the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 575, 579-94
(1997) (providing a brief historical overview of the enmity between the United
States and Cuba and the events that led to the strengthening of the embargo
through the enactment of the Helms-Burton Act of 1996). The President of the
United States originally had the discretion to impose the embargo against Cuba,
but the Helms-Burton Act codified this policy into law. See id. at 576; Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Agora: The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act:
Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 419, 423 (1996)
(describing that the enactment of the Helms-Burton Act unequivocally illustrated
the United States' hostile stance towards the Castro regime). The Helms-Burton
Act provides for a mixture of economic sanctions and inducements to depose the
Castro government, attempts to initiate democratic elections under international
supervision, and safeguards United States nationals from the trafficking of confis-
cated American property. See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad)
Act of 1996 ("Helms-Burton Act") secs. 102, 201, 301, 22 U.S.C. secs. 6032,
6061, 6301; Serge F. Kovaleski, Warming Up a Cold War: Castro Cracks Down
on Cubans Sympathetic to U.S. Policies, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 1999, at AI5 (re-
viewing the major developments in the United States trade embargo against Cuba).
The United States initiated the trade embargo against Cuba in 1961, and made it
comprehensive in 1962. See id. In 1992, the United States further tightened the
embargo by making it illegal for subsidiaries of domestic firms operating overseas
to conduct trade with Cuba. See id. In 1996, the United States imposed mandatory
sanctions on foreign companies conducting business with Cuba. See id.; What
Follows Fidel? Forty Years of Revolutionary Fervor Have Left Cuba "s Economy in
Ruins and its Future Uncertain. But Fidel Castro Remains Unchallenged,
ECONOMIST, Jan. 2, 1999, at 31 (detailing the devastating effects of the embargo,
and Cuban President Fidel Castro's position with the Cuban people); see generally
infra note 180 and accompanying text (examining the codification of the Cuban
embargo during the 1990s).
5. See Statement on United States Policy Toward Cuba, 35 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 7 (Jan. 5, 1999) (explaining that the changes in United States' policy
assist the Cuban people without strengthening the Castro regime). To accomplish
this objective, the Clinton Administration's proposal allows United States residents
to perform an array of functions: send $1,200 a year to specific Cuban families;
sell food to non-governmental entities such as religious organizations; charter
flights to cities other than Havana; establish direct mail service to Cuba; strengthen
Radio and TV Marti; and conduct exchanges in science, academia, and athletics.
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the Baltimore Orioles and the Cuban National Team' in Havana' and
Baltimore! Despite the Cuban government's reactionary measures
See id. The latter proposal called for two exhibition baseball games between the
Baltimore Orioles and the Cuban national team. See Thomas W. Lippman, U.S.
Ready to Play Ball With Cuba: Clinton to Ease Trade Embargo, Using Orioles As
Unofficial Envoys, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1999, at Al. President Clinton stated that
these recommendations will continue the policy of applying pressure on the Cuban
government for democratic change, while seeking additional people-to-people
contacts to improve society. See Statement on United States Policy Toward Cuba,
supra, at 7.
6. See Richard Justice, 'A Great Spectacle For Baseball' on Deck: Orioles
Gear Up for Their Trip to Cuba, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 1999, at D4 (contrasting
the players on the Cuban National Team that played the Orioles with the National
Team that normally competes in international competitions).
7. See Richard Justice, In Cuba, O's Take Home a Win, WASH. POST, Mar.
29, 1999, at D1 (arguing that the Cuban National Team demonstrated that they
could compete with MLB players during the Orioles' 3-2, eleven-inning victory in
Havana).
8. See Richard Justice, Orioles Get Smoked By Cubans: Visitors Dominate
Game, WASH. POST, May 4, 1999, at DI (discussing Cuba's commanding 12-6
victory over the Orioles in the second exhibition game in Baltimore); see also Ori-
oles Lit Up By Cuban Stars (visited May 5, 1999)
<http://espn.go.com/mlb/news/1999/990503/01241658.html> (explaining that in
the first meeting between a Cuban and a MLB team in the United States, the Cu-
bans, with a payroll of approximately S2,250, handily defeated the Orioles, who
operate with a $78 million payroll).
9. See Richard Lapper & Pascal Fletcher, Tough New Punishments Ordered
In Response to Alterations to Embargo: Cuba Launches Clampdown On Links with
U.S., FIN. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1999, at 3 (noting Cuba's hostility towards modifica-
tions in the United States' embargo and the reactionary measures against any do-
mestic opposition). According to the Cuban National Assembly of Popular
Power's reactionary legislation, the Clinton Administration's measures represent a
persistent American effort to subvert Cuba's sovereignty. See id.; see also U.S.-
Cuba Relations: Where Are We and IWhere Are 11'e Heading? Before the Sub-
comm. on W. Hemisphere of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 106th Cong. 1-2
(1999) [hereinafter Where Are We Heading?] (statement of Michael Ranneberger,
Coordinator for Cuban Affairs, Department of State) (recounting the condemnation
from the United States and various human rights organizations of the application of
Cuba's Protection of National Independence and Economy ("Law No. 88"), as
well as the closed trial and sentencing of the Dissident Working Group's four lead-
ers). Cuba convicted the group members under Law No. 88 for "inciting sedition,"
by criticizing Cuba's one-party political system and calling for peaceful demo-
cratic change. See id. at 1; Cloe Cabrera, Cuba Sentences Dissidents to Prison (last
modified Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.tampatrib.comnewsicubalOOh.htm> (ex-
plaining that Law No. 88 penalizes those who work with the foreign press to pro-
mote the United States embargo or support efforts to change Cuba's political sys-
tem). See generally H.R. Res. 99, 106th Cong. (1999)(enacted) (expressing the
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towards the new United States initiatives,' and stem rebukes from
influential Cuban-Americans," Cuban and Major League Baseball
("MLB") players met on the baseball diamond 2 for the first time in
forty years."
Now that the complex relationship between the United States and
Cuba begins to look towards baseball, 4 MLB must continue to con-
House of Representatives' unanimous condemnation of the human rights situation
in Cuba); S. Res. 57, 106th Cong. (1999)(enacted) (expressing the Senate's unani-
mous condemnation of the Castro regime's human rights violations).
10. See Where Are We Heading?, supra note 9, at 2-3 (statement of Michael
Ranneberger) (detailing five initiatives to accomplish the United States foreign
policy towards Cuba). This policy seeks to encourage a democratic transition
through greater contacts with the Cuban people. See id.
11. See id. (statement of Jorge Mas, Vice Chairman, CANF) (denouncing any
effort to engage the Cuban government through baseball, and imploring the United
States to properly act as the moral leader of the free world by not trivializing the
abuses of the Castro government by playing baseball); see also United States Sen-
ate Condemns Cuba Human Rights Record, CUBAN AM. NAT'L FOUND. PRESS
RELEASE, Mar. 25, 1999, (criticizing both the Clinton Administration's overtures
towards greater people to people contacts with Cuba and the human rights abuses
within Cuba). CANF Vice Chairman Jorge Mas urged the United States Senate to
fulfill its moral obligation and support the pro-democracy opposition and inde-
pendent press movement within Cuba. See id.; see also Sports Briefs, (last modi-
fied Mar. 25, 1999) <http://www.bergen.com/sports/briefs/25199903258.htm>
(noting the opposition of Cuban-American Congresswoman Ilena Ros-Lehtinen to
baseball games with Cuba because of Cuba's dismal human rights record).
12. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text (discussing the Orioles-Cuban
National Team exhibition series); see also Kohm, Jr., supra note 2, at 1231 (em-
phasizing the significance of baseball to American society); see Baxter & Domin-
guez, infra note 15, at 12 (explaining the fervor with which Cubans follow base-
ball).
13. See Murray Chass, Orioles to Play in Cuba; First Such Trip Since '59,
WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1999, at D6 (explaining that prior to the Orioles series
against the Cuban National Team, the Cincinnati Reds and the Los Angeles Dodg-
ers were the last MLB teams to play in Cuba). The Reds and Dodgers games took
place in 1959, almost three months after Castro took power. See id. Moreover, sev-
eral MLB teams established their spring training facilities in Cuba, including the
1937 New York Giants, and the 1941, 1942, and 1947 Brooklyn Dodgers. See id.
The 1953 Pittsburgh Pirates, however, stood as the last MLB to conduct their
preseason on the island nation. See id.; see generally ROBERTO GONZALEZ
ECHEVARRIA, THE PRIDE OF HAVANA: A HISTORY OF CUBAN BASEBALL 377
(1999) (remarking that over the last ten years, collegiate American teams and the
Cuban National Team regularly competed against each other in international com-
petitions).
14. See Serge F. Kovaleski, Orioles vs. Cuba 'Is All About Baseball,' WASH.
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front the relationship between these two nations. ' Wielding the big
POST, Mar. 27, 1999, at Al (conveying the statements of undisclosed senior State
Department officials who stated that the exhibition series between the Orioles and
the Cuban National Team reflected increased people-to-people contacts between
the two nations rather than any formal attempt at diplomacy through baseball).
These officials stressed the long-term importance of such contacts despite the cur-
rent relations between the two nations. See id.; see generally Mark Matthews,
Hopes Up For Series Between O's, Cuba: White House Fleible on Spending of
Profits, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 30, 1999, at A8 (detailing the compromise over how
to direct proceeds from the Orioles-Cuban National Team exhibition series); Pre-
ston Williams, O's Angelos Cuba Keep Working on a Deal; Profits Are an Issue,
WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1999, at DI0 (explaining that a resolution on the receipt of
proceeds from the exhibition games threatened the scheduling of the series). The
Clinton Administration departed from the position that the proceeds should benefit
Caritas, a Catholic charity organization in Cuba. See id. This position enabled the
series to take place, as proceeds funded baseball and sporting activities for Cuban
youth. See Eric Green, Orioles To Play Home-and-Home Baseball Series With
Cuba, USIS WASHINGTON FILE (visited Mar. 27, 1999)
<http://www.usia.gov/regionallar/us-cuba/ base 15 .htm>.
15. See Kevin Baxter & Fernando Dominguez, Baseball Si, Cuba No: Castro's
Island May Be a Gold Mine For Major League Talent, But Under His Regime, We
May Never Iow To What Extent, SPORTING NEWS, Mar. 21, 1994, at 12, avail-
able in LEXIS, News library (recounting the history of Cuban and Latino players
in MLB). From 1920 to 1945, more than two dozen Cuban players competed on
many of the diamonds in the Major Leagues. The 1950s brought the stellar play of
popular Cuban players Orestes "Minnie" Minoso, Camillio Pascual, and Pedro
Ramos to MLB. See id. These players were followed by the well-known Cuban
stars of the 1960s and 1970s, including Dagoberto "Bert" Campaneris, Miguel
"Mike" Cuellar, Tony Oliva, Tony Perez, Luis Tiant, and Zoilo Versalles. See
Gonzalez Echevarria, supra note 13, at 356-361 (detailing the careers of many Cu-
ban players in MLB); see also Bjarkman, supra note 1, at 14 (examining the ca-
reers and abilities of Cuban pitchers in MLB); Peter Bjarkman, Lifting the Iron
Curtain of Cuban Baseball, 17 NAT'L PASTTME 30, 32 (1997) [hereinafter Bjark-
man, Lifting the Iron Curtain](reviewing the top players in MLB history and the
current problems surrounding Cuban baseball). The reservoir of potential Cuban-
trained talent, however, dissipated when Cuban President Fidel Castro banned pro-
fessional sports in 1960. See Baxter & Dominguez, supra, at 12.; infra notes 80-81
and accompanying text (describing that MLB fans enjoyed the talents of several
American trained players of Cuban heritage during the 1980s and 1990s). Since
Castro's ban, however, only a handful of players entered MLB from Cuba, with the
most players arriving during the defections of the 1990s. See generally Peter
Bjarkman, Cuba: Four Decades of Cuban Amateur Baseball Tradition, INT'L
BASEBALL RUNDOWN, Sept. 1998, at 15 [hereinafter Bjarkman, Cuba: Four Dec-
ades] (describing the end of professional baseball in Cuba after Castro's 1960 ban
on professional sports, and the limited number of Cuban players that came to the
United States and played for MLB since the ban). Without access to baseball play-
ers, MLB shifted its focus to the Dominican Republic for talented Latin players.
See id.; see Jerry Crasnick, Lost in America: South-Of-The-Border Players
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stick of Baseball Diplomacy'6 can vastly alter both MLB and the an-
tagonistic relations between the United States and Cuba.' 7 To revi-
talize the competitiveness of MLB and to improve international rela-
tions, however, an effective Baseball Diplomacy requires that the
United States, Cuba, and MLB reevaluate the immigration of Cuban
baseball players.
This Comment examines how alterations to the current methods of
baseball immigration from Cuba can improve international relations
between the United States and Cuba, as well as the quality of MLB
Searching For Better Treatment, DENVER POST, Aug. 8, 1994, at D1, available in
LEXIS, News library (noting that almost every Major League team presently oper-
ates a player-development program in the Dominican Republic). The Department
of Immigration grants each team 22-25 visas per year to sustain such international
operations, and allows MLB teams to move these international players to the ros-
ters of teams within the United States. See id.; Bill Shaikin, Angels Take Small In-
ternational Step: The Inroad Into Mexico Doesn't Overcome Their Developmental
Absence In Other Latin Countries, PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Sept. 10, 1996, at DI,
available in 1996 WL 10301000 (describing the efforts of the California Angels
and other teams to mine the best players within their international training com-
plexes to determine which players should receive visas to play in the United
States).
16. See James A. R. Nafziger, International Sports Law: A Replay of Charac-
teristics and Trends, 86 AM. J. INT'L. L. 489, 489-95 (1992) (describing the
evolving field of international sports law, and the use of sport as a tool to respond
to larger socio-economic and political issues); cf Pam Ramsey, The Ping Pong Di-
plomacy, San Diego Table Tennis Association (last modified July 27, 1997)
<http://www.sdtta.com/pp-diplomacy.html> (emphasizing the effectiveness of the
historic 1971 Ping-Pong Diplomacy between the People's Republic of China and
the United States in promoting understanding between the Chinese and American
people). See generally Andy Kay Lieberman, Baseball Diplomacy -
USA/Nicaragua Style 1996, (Int'l Inst. For Sports Dip]., Los Angeles, Cal.), Feb.
27, 1996, at 5 (identifying the effective "Bats Not Bombs" campaign between the
Nicaraguan National Team and four Californian college teams that utilized base-
ball as a way to improve international relations between the previously warring
nations). For the purposes of this Comment, "Baseball Diplomacy" refers to the
ability of the United States and Cuba to utilize the sport of baseball as a tool for
improving their international relations.
17. See Kovaleski, supra note 4, at A13 (delineating the key events in United
States-Cuba relations since the 1959 Revolution that brought Fidel Castro to
power). In particular, the 1996 downing of two Cuban-exile group planes over in-
ternational waters and the subsequent adoption of the harsh Helms-Burton Act,
which imposes mandatory sanctions against foreign companies that conduct busi-
ness in Cuba, embittered the already sour relations between these nations. See id. at
13-15. See generally infra note 179 and accompanying text (explaining how the
shooting of the exile group planes led to the enactment of the Helms-Burton Act).
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itself. Section I examines United States immigration laws regarding
foreign baseball players and the rules governing MLB's draft system.
Section II contrasts the competing modes of Cuban baseball immi-
gration in the 1990s, and illustrates that the defection and free agency
fostered by the Orlando "El Duque" Hernandez model"' hurts MLB.
Section III examines early Baseball Diplomacy efforts, and the tenor
of bilateral relations after the baseball defections of the 1990s. Sec-
tion IV proposes an alternative method of Cuban baseball immigra-
tion as part of a comprehensive Baseball Diplomacy, which is de-
signed to improve the quality of both MLB and the international
relations between the United States and Cuba.
I. THE BASE-PATH: HOW UNITED STATES
IMMIGRATION LAWS AND MLB RULES
INTERACT TO ALLOW FOREIGN BASEBALL
PLAYERS TO COMPETE IN THE UNITED STATES
Congress responded to the increasing globalization of the sports
world'9 by amending existing immigration law with the Immigration
18. See infra notes 134-157 and accompanying text (classifying the "El Duque"
model as one that meanders between United States immigration laws and MLB's
Rules to provide a large contract for defecting Cuban baseball players). This model
draws its name from Cuban pitcher Orlando Hernandez' nickname, "El Duque,"
which derives from the nickname of actor John Wayne, "The Duke." See L. Jon
Wertheim & Don Yaeger, Fantastic Voyage: Three Fellow Refugees Say the Tale
of Yankees Ace Orlando (El Duque) Hernandez's Escape From Cuba Doesn't
Hold Water, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 30, 1998, at 61. See generally Bjarkman,
supra note 1, at 15 (detailing the career pitching records of the Cuban League). "El
Duque" holds the Cuban League record for the highest lifetime winning percent-
age, winning over 73% of his games. See id.
19. See MLB, Office of the Commissioner, More Than 21 Percent of Major
League Players Born Outside the U.S., NEWS RELEASE, Apr. 8, 1999 (noting that,
although the number fluctuates almost daily, more than 21% of MLB's team ros-
ters possess players who come from a nation other than the United States). Moreo-
ver, of the 178 MLB players born outside of the United States, 159 hale from Latin
American nations. See id. Most of these players hale from either the Dominican
Republic or Puerto Rico. See id.; see generally Rod Beaton, Big-League Affilia-
tions, USA TODAY, Mar. 26, 1999, at 22C (listing the twenty-six players of Cu-
ban heritage that compete throughout MLB organizations, including the teams'
minor league affiliates); Wayne Lockwood, Baseball Goes International: Major
Leagues in a Scramble to Sign Best of Foreign Talent, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
1999] 1655
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Act of 1990 ("Immigration Act").20 Subsequently modified, the Im-
migration Act provides specific visa categories, known as the "0"
and "P" categories, for the arrival of athletes who do not intend to
permanently reside in the United States.2 For many foreign baseball
players, the "0" and "P" visa categories provide a ticket to MLB.22
A. THE "0" VISA CATEGORY
As the international flavor of MLB continues to expand, both the
May 20, 1996, at D5, available in LEXIS, News Library (discussing the increasing
percentage of foreign players in MLB due to the expanded international scouting
efforts of MLB teams).
20. See Jon Jordan, Comment, The Growing Entertainment and Sports Indus-
tries Internationally: New Immigration Laws Provide For Foreign Athletes and
Entertainers, 12 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 207, 207-09 (1995) (stating that
the Immigration and Nationality Act became policy in response to the rise of for-
eign athletes in American sports).
21. See id. at 213-35 (discussing "0" and "P" visa categories). Players who
wish to permanently reside in the United States can become permanent residents
under the Immigration and Nationality Act sec. 203, 8 U.S.C. sec.
1153(b)(1)(A)(1992), amended by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 ("Immigration
and Nationality Act"). See id. Prior to the Immigration and Nationality Act, non-
immigrant athletes sought to play in the United States under the "H- 1" category as
persons of "distinguished merit and ability," or under the "H-2" category for posi-
tions where no qualified American workers were available. See Immigration and
Nationality Act sec. 101, 8 U.S.C. sec. 1101 (a)(15)(H)(i)(b), (ii)(b)(Supp. 1 1989)
(describing the "H" visa category). The "H-I" category provided for aliens of
"distinguished merit and ability" who came to the United States "to perform serv-
ices of an exceptional nature requiring such merit and ability .... ." Id. Since the
"H-I" category based admission on the achievements of the athlete or entertainer,
these performers favored this category. Jordan, supra note 20, at 210. By contrast,
the "H-2" category required that a dearth of Americans exist for particular serv-
ices, and was subsequently more difficult to illustrate than the accomplishment-
based requirements of the "H-I" category. See id. at 210-13. While the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act provided the "0" and "P" categories for entertainers and
athletes respectively, delays in its execution led to the use of a new H-lB category
for six months. See id. at 211. On April 1, 1992, the Miscellaneous and Technical
Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991 put the "0" and "P" catego-
ries into effect. See id. at 213.
22. See Immigration and Nationality Act sec. 203, 8 U.S.C. sec. 1153 (b)(l)(A)
(stating that there is a preference for aliens with extraordinary ability, among other
characteristics); see also infra notes 24-49 and accompanying text (setting forth the
ways in which foreign baseball players utilize "0" or "P" visas to play in MLB).
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"O" and "P" visa categories gain added importance.2 Strictly applied
to the baseball world for the purposes of this Comment, the "0" visa
category provides an extremely practical form of entry for proven
baseball players.2 4 In addition to providing temporary work permits
for exceptional foreign baseball players, the "0" visa category also
enables the coaches, trainers, and families of these players to enter
the United States.25
Applying for the "0" visa requires that this large contingent of
foreign baseball players follow two main steps. First, a baseball team
must contract with the foreign player ' 6 and file a petition with one of
the four regional Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS")
Centers that possess jurisdiction in the area where the foreign base-
ball player will compete.27 The player's petition for the "0" category
visa must include the baseball team's schedule with the specific dates
and locations of each game.2 If the player is traded to another team,
the player's new team must file a separate petition.- Second, ap-
proval of these "0" visa petitions requires consultation with a peer
group in the player's field." Baseball player peer groups can consist
of other players, managers, or baseball officials as long as these indi-
viduals possess sufficient baseball expertise and can attest to the ex-
23. See Lockwood, supra note 19, at D5 (examining the increasing Latin
American presence in MLB); see also Crasnick, supra note 15, at DI (identifying
the utility of international facilities operated by MLB teams).
24. See Jordan, supra note 20, at 222 (describing how amateur athletes who are
not yet established or recognized have difficulty qualifying under such standards).
25. See id. at 218-19 (detailing the various "0" visa categories available for
people to accompany athletes and entertainers).
26. See iifra notes 50, 52-60 and accompanying text (describing how the resi-
dency status of baseball players affects their ability to sign contracts).
27. See 2 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 25-
22 (1998) (stating that the employer or agent must file a Form 1-129 with the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service to seek an "0" or "P" visa). For "P-I" visas,
MLB has entered into an agreement to process all petitions at the Northern Service
Center. See id. at 25-37.
28. See 8 C.F.R. sec. 214.2(o)(2)(iv)(A) (1998) (explaining that such an itiner-
ary is required).
29. See 8 C.F.R. sec. 214.2(o)(2)(iv)(B)-(C) (1998) (delineating the specific
procedures for foreign players who are traded to another team).
30. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 27, at 25-23 n.8, 25-24, 25-25 (defining a
peer group as an organization comprised of practitioners in the alien's occupation).
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ceptional ability of the foreign player.'
The "0" visa category contains three subcategories. The first sub-
category, the "0-1" visa, enables an alien to enter the United States if
the alien possesses extraordinary athletic ability32 that is supported by
sustained recognition.33 Congress enables an unlimited allotment of
these "0-1" visas per year,34 and allows foreign baseball players to
use these visas for a maximum period of three years." The second
31. See 8 C.F.R. sec. 214.2(o)(5)(I)(A)-(B) (clarifying the peer group consulta-
tion); see also GORDON, supra note 27, at 25-24 ("The evident purpose of the [peer
group] consultation is to support the claim of extraordinary ability or achievement
with an outside opinion."). When requests for a petition are time-sensitive, and a
consultation with a peer group cannot take place via phone, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") must make its decision without the peer group's
opinion. See id. at 25-25 n. 15.
32. See Immigration and Nationality Act sec. 101(a), 8 U.S.C. sec.
110 1(a)(46)(1992), amended by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546; see also Jor-
dan, supra note 20, at 234 (describing that "extraordinary ability" is an amorphous
term that became more clearly defined as a "distinction" for performers of the arts
only after intense lobbying).
33. See Immigration and Nationality Act sec. 203, 8 U.S.C. sec. 11 53(b)(I)(A);
see also GORDON ET AL., supra note 27, at 25-16 (explaining the characteristics
required to illustrate international acclaim). Such international acclaim can be es-
tablished by providing evidence of either receiving a major international award, or
by producing three of the following: 1) documentation of receipt of an award for
excellence; 2) documentation of membership in the field for which the alien seeks
classification, and outstanding achievement as judged by experts within the field;
3) professionally published material about the alien's work in the field; 4) evidence
that the alien is qualified to judge others in the same field; 5) evidence that the
alien worked in a distinguished organization, and provided an essential service; 6)
evidence that the alien receives a large salary based upon his standing within the
field. See id.; see also Jordan, supra note 20, at 219-21 (explaining the qualifica-
tions for the "0-1" visa category).
34. See Larry Carp & Mark Goldman, Key Entertainment and Sports Law Pro-
visions in the New Immigration Law, 9 SPG ENT. & SPORTS LAW 9, 10
(1991)(explaining that Congress intended not to limit the number of "0-I" visas
granted).
35. See Jordan, supra note 20, at 222 (stating that while the time period for the
foreign baseball player's visa may not exceed three years, the Attorney General
can designate the time provided within that three-year span for the non-
immigrant's admitted purpose). See generally 8 C.F.R. sec. 214.2(o)( 11)-(12)
(1998) (setting forth further restrictions on the permitted length of stay under the
"0-1" visa). Additionally, players may seek one year extensions of an "0-1" visa
to continue playing baseball. See id. Moreover, the foreign baseball player can be
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subcategory, known as the "0-2" visa, provides a nonimmigrant visa
for an alien to accompany the "0-1" alien.X For foreign baseball
players, for instance, a coach or trainer can utilize this "0-2" visa
subcategory to accompany the player. 7 Such a coach or trainer who
accompanies the "0-1" baseball player, however, must only arrive
for a temporary stay or visit." Additionally, this coach or trainer
must maintain a foreign residence without harboring an intention to
abandon that residence. 9 The third "0" visa subcategory, known as
the "0-3" visa, permits the spouse or children of an "0-1" or "0-2"
alien to accompany or follow their alien family member." Thus, the
"0" visa subcategories provide avenues for an extraordinary foreign
baseball player, as well as his coach and immediate family members,
to reach the United States.
B. THE "P" VISA CATEGORY
The "P" visa category provides for the temporary employment of
admitted to the United States both ten days before the "0" visa takes effect and ten
days after it expires. See id. The player, however, is prohibited from working dur-
ing these ten day periods. See id. at sec. 214.2(o)(12)(ii).
36. Immigration and Nationality Act sec. 101 (a), 8 U.S.C. sec. 1 101(a)( 15)(o)(ii);
see also GORDON ET AL., supra note 27, at 25-20 (explaining that "0-2" visas only
exist for assisting athletic or artistic fields, and the fields of education, science, and
business do not receive such visas).
37. Immigration and Nationality Act sec. 101(a), 8 U.S.C. sec.
1 101(a)(15)(o)(ii)(II); see also GORDON ET AL, supra note 27, at 25-20 (claiming
the "0-2" aliens must possess critical skills that are integral to the athlete's per-
formance).
38. Immigration and Nationality Act sec. 101(a), 8 U.S.C. sec.
1101(a)(15)(o)(ii)(D; see also GORDON ET AL., supra note 27 at 25-28 (asserting
that "temporary" is not defined by the statute, but that the Department of State
suggests that "temporary" involves a stay that is reasonable, finite, and does not
become permanent residency). According to the Department of State, a stay is
temporary as long as there is no intent to remain permanently. See id.
39. See Carp & Goldman, supra note 34, at 11 (defining the intent necessary to
illustrate that the alien desires to abandon their residence); see also Immigration
and Nationality Act and Nationality Act sec. 101(a)(15)(o)(iv), 8 U.S.C. secs.
1101-1524 (1992), amended by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (setting forth
the provisions relating to the foreign residency requirement).
40. See Immigration and Nationality Act sec. 101(a)(15)(o)(iii), 8 U.S.C. sec.
1101 (a)(15)(o)(iii)(detailing the circumstances in which certain persons may ac-
company an athlete or artist).
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internationally renowned athletes and certain outstanding entertain-
ers. While the "P" visa includes four subcategories,42 the "P-1" visa
subcategory proves particularly useful for foreign baseball players
because it can cover both internationally recognized individual base-
ball players, or each member of an internationally recognized team.
Thus, even if the individual team members do not enjoy international
recognition, they can still obtain a "P-1" visa.4"
Although the procedures for obtaining a "P" visa are generally the
same for the "0" visa, the "P" visa category contains less stringent
eligibility requirements45 and a longer period of stay. 6 The items re-
quired to petition for a "P-I" visa illustrate why this visa category
41. See Jordan, supra note 20, at 227-28 (explaining that athletes and entertain-
ers are the only types of immigrants permitted to utilize the "P" visa category); see
also Carp & Goldman, supra note 34, at 11 (discussing the limited application of
the "P" visa category).
42. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 27, at 25-30 (identifying that the "P- 1" visa
is available for athletes); see id. at 25-40 (discussing the "P-2" visas for "Artists
and Entertainers Under Reciprocal Exchange Programs"); see id. at 25-42 (setting
forth the "P-3" visas for "Culturally Unique Artists and Entertainers"); see id. at
25-43, 25-44 (describing the "P-4" visas for "Accompanying Spouse and Chil-
dren"); see id. (suggesting the requirements and benefits of the aforementioned
visa categories).
43. See id. at 25-36, 25-37 (describing the regulations for both teams and indi-
vidual members of teams to receive international recognition and "P-1" visas).
44. See 8 C.F.R. sec. 214.2(p)(4)(i)(A)-(B)(1998) (setting forth the regulations
for obtaining "P-I" visas for non-internationally recognized team members of an
internationally recognized team).
45. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 27, at 25-30 (contrasting the "0-1" visa
category's "extraordinary ability" requirement and the requirements of the "P-1"
visa category); see also 8 C.F.R. see. 214.2(p)(1) (observing that unlike the "ex-
traordinary ability" requirements of the "0-1" category, baseball players seeking to
enter under a "P-I" visa only need to demonstrate that they can compete at an "in-
temationally recognized level of performance"). Such a standard indicates a top
level performer who, by demonstrating a high degree of skill, is recognized as such
in more than one country. See id.
46. See Immigration and Nationality Act, sec. 214, 8 U.S.C. sec. 1184
(a)(2)(B)(i) amended by Illegal Immigration and Nationality Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (emphasizing that under the "P" visa category,
athletes seeking to compete in the United States can stay for a maximum of ten
years, whereas under the "0" visa category, foreign athletes seeking to play in the
United States can stay for a maximum of three years). According to the statute, this
ten year period consists of an initial five year period, and an additional five year
period subject to the Attorney General's discretion. See id.
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provides the most obtainable visa for foreign baseball players. First,
to petition for the "P-I" visa, a foreign baseball player needs a ten-
dered contract with either MLB or a specific team." In addition,
these baseball players must provide documentation of at least two of
the following: participation with a national team during international
competition; a written statement by a MLB official detailing the
player's international reputation; or evidence that the player received
a significant award or honor in the sport."8 Consequently, by demon-
strating sufficient talent to warrant a MLB official to attest to the
player's ability, a foreign national team baseball player who tenders
a contract with a MLB team can obtain a "P-I" visa. Therefore, the
"P-I" visa provides many foreign baseball players a less obstructed
path to play in the United States.49
C. THE "MLB" CATEGORY
MLB's own operating procedures with respect to the signing and
drafting of baseball players tremendously assist the ability of foreign
baseball players to obtain either "0" or "P" visas. These procedures
clearly express the eligibility requirements for MILB teams to signO
or draft5' baseball players under the terms of Major League Rules 3
and 4, respectively. These Rules apply only to players who never
signed a Major League or Minor League contract and to those who
47. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 30, at 25-36, 25-37 (describing the re-
quirements applicable for foreign baseball players to sign with MLB teams).
48. See id. (setting forth the requirements for the "P" visa); see also Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, sec. 101(p)(4)(ii)(B)(detailing the regulations for foreign
baseball players to enter MLB).
49. See Thomas R. Dominczyk, Comment, The New Melting Pot: as American
Attitudes Toward Foreigners Continue to Decline, Athletes are Welcomed With
Open Arms, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 165, 170-75 (1998) (asserting that the re-
quirements for "P-I" visas are easily fulfilled by talented foreign athletes).
50. See Major League Baseball Rules, Rule 3 (1998) (defining the eligibility
requirements to sign contracts, and the terms of these contracts for players who re-
side either in foreign nations or domestically).
51. See Major League Baseball Rules, Rules 4, 4.2(a)(1998) (proscribing the
procedures for the drafting of first year players); see also First-Year Player Draft
Rules (last modified May 28, 1998) <http://www.majorleaguebaseball
.com/draft/rules.sml> (explaining that MLB's First-Year Player Draft occurs each
June via conference call among the thirty Major League teams).
52. See Major League Baseball Rules, supra note 50, at Rule 3(a)(l)(A) (stat-
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satisfy certain residency requirements. 3 The residency requirements
of the rules permit only players who reside in "the 50 States of the
United States of America, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and
any other Commonwealth, Territory or Possession of the United
States of America, 5 4 to gain exposure to the First-Year Player
Draft." For foreign players who do not reside in the aforementioned
areas, however, the rules differ.56
If foreign baseball players do not comply with the residency re-
quirements of MLB Rules 3 and 4, their career paths and salaries are
dramatically affected. For such players, only the minimum age re-
quirements of Rule 3 govern their potential entry into MLB.5 Once
these age requirements are met, the foreign players can freely negoti-
ate with all thirty MLB teams to sign a contract." Therefore, in con-
trast to the players whose negotiating rights become limited to just
one team by the draft,59 the structure of MLB's Rules enable foreign
ing that players who never previously contracted with a Major or Minor League
team, and who satisfy the residency requirements, can sign a contract only after
exposure to the Rule 4 Draft).
53. See id. at Rules 3(a)(l)(A)-(B), 4(a) (defining the residency requirements
for Rules 3 and 4, respectively).
54. Id. at Rule 3(a)(1)(A). Moreover, under this rule, MLB recognizes players
as United States residents if they enroll in a United States high school or college.
See id. Additionally, MLB further recognizes players as United States residents if
they establish either a legal residence within the United States at the signing of
their individual contracts, or within one year prior to signing their contracts. See id.
55. See First-Year Player Draft Rules, supra note 51 (detailing the procedures of
the First-Year Player Draft).
56. See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (delineating the application of
MLB Rules to foreign players who do not reside in the areas specified by Rule 3).
57. See Major League Baseball Rules, supra note 50, at Rule 3(a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii)
(stating that foreign baseball players must at least attain age seventeen when they
sign with a team). MLB also permits teams to sign players who are sixteen years
old at the time of signing as long as these players turn seventeen either during the
season or by September 1st. See id.
58. See id. (detailing the effect of the age requirement).
59. See Telephone Interview with Robert Lenaghan, Assistant General Coun-
sel, Major League Baseball Players Association (Feb. 26, 1999) (stating that when
a team drafts a player, the team holds the exclusive negotiating rights to that
player); see also First-Year Player Draft Rules, supra note 51 (indicating that
teams retain the rights to negotiate with the player that they draft until one week
prior to the next year's Draft or until the player enters or returns to college on a
full-time basis).
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players to immediately become free agents.'
Applying these MLB Rules to the requirements of the "0" and "P"
visa categories illustrates the rather facile entry into MLB for foreign
baseball players. First, for a foreign player to receive either an "0" or
"P" visa, both visa categories require that the player sign a contract
with a MLB team.6' Since MLB's Rule 3 places an age restriction as
the only limitation upon the signing of a foreign baseball player to a
contract, this requirement is readily satisfied when the player attains
the minimum age. 62 Second, each visa category establishes certain
ability-based requirements.6 1 Many MLB teams operate multi-million
dollar international scouting programs to locate foreign baseball
players and assess whether they are sufficiently talented to satisfy the
respective ability requirements of either the "0" or "P" visa."6 Once
these teams locate sufficiently talented players, they can sign the free
60. See Dave Anderson, El Duque's Man, a Hero of the Cuban People, Stashes
Two More, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 11, 1999, at C31 (explaining that foreign players with
residency in nations other than Cuba and the United States become free agents who
can sign with any team, whereas foreign players that establish residency within the
United States are subject to MLB's Draft); see also Major League Baseball Rules,
supra note 50, Rules 3(a)(1), 4(a) (specifying the relationship between residency in
the United States and the requirements for signing contracts and exposing players
to the Draft).
61. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 27, at 25-36, 25-37 (noting that both "0"
and "P" visa requirements stipulate that foreign baseball players sign a contract
with a MLB team).
62. See Major League Baseball Rules, supra note 50, Rule 3(a)(l)(B)(i)-(ii)
(mandating that foreign players must reach a certain age to sign contracts with
MLB teams).
63. See Jordan supra note 20, at 222 (explaining that the "0-" visa requires
the foreign player to demonstrate extraordinary and internationally recognized
athletic ability); see also supra note 48 and accompanying text (observing that for
a foreign baseball player to obtain a "P-1" visa, the player must similarly sign a
contract with a MLB team, and obtain at least two of the following: an experience
with a touring national team, a significant award, or a MLB official who can attest
to the player's international reputation).
64. See Crasnick, supra note 15, at D I (describing that the international train-
ing facilities operated by MLB teams groom foreign baseball players and deter-
mine which players will receive one of the team's allotted "0" or "P" visas). The
INS supplies each team with 22 to 25 of these visas for their international scouting
operations. See id.; see also Shaikin, supra note 15, at DI (describing the efforts of
the California Angels and other teams to mine the best players within their inter-
national training complexes to determine which players should receive visas to
play in the United States).
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agent foreign players to a contract if the players meet the minimum
age requirements. 6' Thus, when foreign baseball players sign lucra-
tive free agent contracts and obtain the visas necessary to enter the
United States, they can compete upon MLB diamonds.6 For Cuban
players, though, the road is much more circuitous.
Although both the "0" and "P" visa categories provide routes for
foreign baseball players to enter the United States, players from
Cuba need not apply. This discrepancy stems from the rancorous in-
ternational relations between the United States and Cuba.67 Conse-
quently, the interaction of MLB's internal policies and the hostile
relations between Cuba and the United States steer Cuban baseball
players in a different direction.68
Former MLB Commissioner Bowie Kuhn clarified MLB's posi-
tion regarding Cuban baseball players in a 1977 letter known as the
Kuhn Directive. 69 Subsequently amended in 1991,70 the Kuhn Direc-
65. See Major League Baseball Rules, supra note 50, Rule 3(a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii)
(detailing the minimum age provisions required for foreign players to sign con-
tracts with MLB teams).
66. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text (explaining how the connec-
tion between MLB's Rules and the requirements of the "0" and "P" visa catego-
ries permit foreign baseball players to compete in MLB).
67. See supra notes 3-4 (characterizing the recent developments and history
behind the antagonistic international relations between the United States and
Cuba).
68. See infra notes 83-107 and accompanying text (defining the Rene Arocha
model that stems from the interaction of the MLB and United States policies); see
also infra notes 109-132 and accompanying text (contrasting the Rene Arocha
model with the "El Duque" model, which achieves free agency for defecting Cu-
ban players instead of subjecting these players to the Draft).
69. See Letter from Bowie K. Kuhn, Commissioner, MLB, to All MLB Clubs 1
(Apr. 5, 1977)[hereinafter Kuhn Directive] (forbidding all MLB teams from con-
ducting tryouts, workouts, discussions, negotiations, or signings with any Cuban
baseball players); see generally Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 15, at 12 (as-
serting that the 1977 Kuhn Directive prevented MLB officials from speaking or
negotiating with Cuban baseball players in Cuba).
70. See Memorandum from William A. Murray, Office of the Commissioner,
to All Major League Chief Executive Officers, General Managers, and Scouting
Directors (Aug. 9, 1991) (on file with author)(detailing the revised MLB policy
regarding the scouting and signing of non-American and Canadian players). The
modifications occurred one month after Arocha's defection in response to many
MLB teams' concerns about their respective ability to compete and scout equally
for foreign baseball players. See id.; see also Telephone Interview with William A.
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five forbids MLB teams from either discussing or negotiating with
anyone in Cuba regarding the signing of any baseball player in
Cuba.7' This clear policy effectively forces Cuban players to seek
residency elsewhere if they desire to play in MLB.7 Additionally,
aside from the hostility between the United States and Cuba, the lat-
ter nation's anti-professional baseball disposition frowns upon play-
ers seeking to join a professional baseball league." Such a disposi-
tion, combined with the extremely favorable United States
immigration policy that enables Cubans to achieve residency if they
Murray, Executive Director of Baseball Operations, MLB (Mar. 23, 1999) (stating
that the revised policy reaffirmed MLB's compliance with the United States' eco-
nomic embargo against Cuba, and demonstrated MLB's desire to put all teams on
equal footing by preventing Canadian and non-American MLB scouts from signing
Cuban players within Cuba).
71. See Kuhn Directive, supra note 69 (explaining key provisions of the one
page Kuhn Directive which prevents MLB teams from scouting or signing Cuban
baseball players in Cuba). See, e.g., Steve Fainaru, Did L.A. Step over the Line?
Dodgers Accused of a Cuban Infiltration, BOSTON GLOBE, May 2, 1999, at D 1,
available in 1999 WL 6060438 (disclosing that the Dodgers violated the Kuhn Di-
rective by holding secret tryouts and assisting the defections of two Cuban play-
ers); see also Ross Newhan, Dodgers Punished For Role in Signing Cuban Play-
ers, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 1999, at D5, available in 1999 WL 2172877 (detailing
that MLB Commissioner Selig granted free agency to Cuban players Juan Carlos
Diaz and Josue Perez from the Dodgers' minor league system because the Dodgers
violated the Kuhn Directive); see generally Ronald Blum, Selig 'Comfortable" As
Commissioner, NEWS & OBSERVER, (Raleigh, N.C.), July 11, 1999, at CIO, avail-
able in WL 2759381 (explaining that MLB fined the Dodgers S200,000 for vio-
lating the Kuhn Directive). Additionally, the Dodgers may face further fines for
violating the Trading with The Enemy Act. See Trading with the Enemy Act of
1917, ch. 106, sec. 16, 40 Stat. 411, 425, amended by 50 U.S.C sec. 1601, sec.
103(a), Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625 (1977) (empowering the President to
fine individuals convicted of violating provisions of the Trading with The Enemy
Act).
72. See Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 15, at 12-13 (emphasizing that the
Kuhn Directive effectively limits the ability of MLB teams to sign only those Cu-
ban players who can establish residency within a country other than Cuba).
73. See Peter Bjarkman, Baseball and Fidel Castro: The Maxinun Leader Af-
fected Baseball in Cuba, But He Was Never a Big League Pitching Prospect, 18
NAT'L PASTIME 64, 65-68 (1998)(noting that after Castro banned professional
sports in 1960, he reinstituted baseball as an amateur sport, contributing to the
hostility against professional sports); see also Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 15,
at 12 (maintaining that Castro's 1960 ban of professional sports led to the rise of
amateur baseball in Cuba, and the decrease of talented Cuban players in MLB).
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live in the United States for one year, 4 presents a clear choice for
Cuban baseball players. If a Cuban player desires to play in MLB,
these policies compel the player to defect.75 Ultimately, encouraging
revered Cuban athletes to defect only further embitters relations be-
tween the United States and Cuba.76
II. LA MANERA CUBANA - "THE CUBAN WAY"-
HOW CUBAN PLAYERS COME TO
THE UNITED STATES
The dramatic changes in the international climate following the
demise of the Soviet Union drastically affected the baseball world as
74. See Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, sec. 1, 80 Stat.
1161, 1161, amended by Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. sec. 1255, sec.
203(i), sec. 1, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 108 (1996) ("CAA") (providing perma-
nent resident status to Cubans who reside in the United States for at least one
year); Ruth Ellen Wasem, Cuban Migration to the United States: Trends and Is-
sues, CRS REP. FOR CONGRESS, May 25, 1995, at 1 (explaining that this policy is
not available to any other nationality); see also Matter of Marchena, 12 Imm. &
Nat. Dec. 355 (1967) (explaining that under the CAA, the Attorney General is
granted discretion to confer permanent resident status upon Cubans that are ad-
mitted into the United States). See generally David Beard, Cuban Athletes Keep
Tying to Leave No-Future Situations, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 30, 1993, at C4,
available in WL 8237377 (explaining that Cuban athletes who arrive in the United
States are generally granted resident status under the CAA).
75. See supra notes 49, 50 and accompanying text (arguing that United States
immigration laws and MLB's Rules compel Cuban players who desire to play in
the Major Leagues to defect to the United States). But see infra notes 108-133 and
accompanying text (explaining that the "El Duque" model departs from both the
combination of United States immigration laws and MLB's Rules, which subjects
foreign players to the Draft, and instead achieves free agency for defecting Cuban
players).
76. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (identifying recent develop-
ments and providing an historical prospective on the antagonistic international re-
lations between the United States and Cuba); see also Tessie Borden, Sports Agent
in the Company Of Politicians; George Magazine Puts Him on List of Fascinating
Men, SUN-SENTINEL, (Ft. Lauderdale), May 24, 1998, at 3B, available in LEXIS,
News Library (explaining that Cuban defections in general, and the "El Duque"
model in particular, sour United States-Cuba relations and personally hurt Castro
because he is a baseball fan). See generally Anita Snow, Castro Hails 'Historic'
Victoty, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 4, 1999, available in WL, APNEWS (relating
Castro's abhorrence for the financial lures of MLB that attract Cuban baseball de-
fectors).
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well.' Although MLB's Cuban-trained talent pool remained dry for
thirty years by failing to add new players, the end of the Cold War
ushered in a new era.78 Subsequently, as the more than $4 billion in
yearly Soviet assistance to Cuba ceased, 7 and the conditions of Cu-
ban baseball deteriorated, Cuban players sought a better life in MLB.
In 1991, a new wave of Cuban-trained"" players arrived," beginning
77. See ihfra notes 175-93 and accompanying text (discussing how the cessa-
tion of Soviet assistance to Cuba and the implementation of a comprehensive eco-
nomic embargo by the United States rapidly deteriorated the conditions of Cuban
baseball, and turned the players' attention to the well-paying careers of MLB).
78. See Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 15, at 12 (explaining that with the
collapse of the Cuban economy, Cuban baseball players now earn less than S 120
per month). By contrast, the average monthly salary for non-baseball playing Cu-
bans remains about $11. See James C. McKinley Jr., In City of Castro 's Triumph,
Most Still Back Him, N.Y. TtMES, Jan. 2, 1999, at A3 (detailing the poor economic
conditions faced by many Cubans). Many goods and services are in short supply,
rendering difficult financial conditions for the majority of Cubans. Hernandez, su-
pra note 3, at A24. Additionally, the per capita gross domestic product is the low-
est in Ibero-America at $1,300. See id. Moreover, the corruption in Cuba is among
the worst in Latin America because the dearth of basic goods compels many offi-
cials to steal items from the government. See id. The United States embargo, de-
signed to encourage a democratic transition in Cuba by blockading the Cuban gov-
ernment from the rest of the world, exacerbates the economic conditions within
Cuba. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.; U.S.-Cuba Commission: U.S.-
Cuba History (visited Mar. 27, 1999) <http://uscubacommission .org/history.html>
(specifying that aid and loans from the former Soviet Union totaled over S100 bil-
lion from 1962 to 1991, and that severe shortages resulted from the cessation of
such aid in 1991).
79. See McKinley, supra note 78, at A3 (discussing the deleterious effects
upon Cuba's economy after Soviet assistance ceased).
80. See Jim Caple, Cuba Trip Good for Baseball (visited Mar. 24, 1999)
<http://espn.go.com/premium/mlb/columnstoffbaseO 1177934.htmnl> (stating that
approximately 140 Cuban born players competed in MLB). Almost all of the play-
ers of Cuban heritage that competed in MLB during the 1980s, however, grew up
in the United States as the sons of Cuban refugees. See Pedro Gomez, One More
Step: The Orioles' Cuban Exhibition Strengthens the Bond between Baseball and
Cuban Fans (last modified Mar. 24, 1999) <http:/l/%ww.majorleaguebaseball
.com/news/0323cuba.sml> (recounting the history of Cuban baseball players
within MLB, and the talent of American-trained players of Cuban heritage such as
Jose Canseco, Bobby Estalella, Alex Fernandez, Mike Lowell, Eli Marrero, Rafael
Palmeiro, and David Segui). See generally Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 15, at
22 (discussing the many popular Cuban-born and trained players in MLB history).
81. See Bruce Brown, Cuban Baseball, ATLANTIC, June 1984, at 110 (noting
that former Cuban National Team player Barbaro Garbey competed in MLB dur-
ing the early 1980s). Garbey, a Mariel refugee, came to the United States with five
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with the defection of Cuban National team pitcher Rene Arocha.
Arocha's bold step paved the way for other Cuban players to play in
MLB,82 and provided an elementary model for MLB to deal with the
new Cuban influx.
A. THE RENE AROCHA MODEL
After ten years with the Cuban National team, Arocha abandoned
the sagging conditions of Cuban baseball for the freedom and op-
portunity of American baseball.83 Arocha's defection, though, posed
problems for both his family, and for MLB. The former National
Team pitcher feared that the Cuban government would seek reprisals
against his family, 4 which made his decision to defect extremely dif-
other players in 1980. See William G. Belden, Paradise Lost: The Continuing
Plight of the Excludable Mariel Cubans, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 181, 181-89
(1996) (detailing the situation of the approximately 125,000 Cuban boat immi-
grants that came from the Cuban port of Mariel in 1980, and the difficulty that the
United States faced with absorbing these refugees). Of the Mariel Cuban players,
only Garbey succeeded in playing MLB baseball, albeit briefly. See Gonzalez
Echevarria, supra note 13, at 388. See generally Peter Bjarkman, A Look At the
Cuban Sluggers, INT'L BASEBALL RUNDOWN, Late Winter 1999, at 14 (describing
the rise and fall of Garbey in MLB, and his attempt at a comeback during the 1995
spring training lockout).
82. See Beaton, supra note 19, at 22C (listing the current number of Cuban
players within each MLB organization, including the teams' minor league affili-
ates). Currently, twenty-six players with Cuban heritage are dispersed among thir-
teen MLB organizations, with six Cuban defectors competing on MLB teams. See
id.; see also Gonzalez Echevarria, supra note 13, at 388-91 (reviewing the careers
of eighteen Cuban defectors in the 1990s).
83. See Sharon Robb, Cuban Pitcher Defects to Chase Major-League Dream,
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 7, 1991, at C4, available in LEXIS, News Library (describing
Arocha's defection). After a summer series against the United States, Arocha left
the Cuban National team at Miami's International Airport on July 10, 1991, and
requested political asylum. See id. But see Anne-Marie Garcia, Cuba On A Par
With the Major Leagues (visited Apr. 15, 1999) <http://www.
granma.cu/granma/ingles/abrill/13abr4i.html> (asserting that most of the best
players on the Cuban team rejected offers to play in MLB while abroad because
they love playing for Cuba).
84. See Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 15, at 12 (explaining that soon after
Arocha defected, the Cuban government accused him of "high treason against the
revolution," although no form of retaliation against his family occurred). The re-
cent 40th anniversary of the Cuban Revolution displayed the continued strength of
the Cuban government's revolutionary fervor. See McKinley, supra note 78, at A3.
At the anniversary celebration, banners were displayed bearing the motto: "To be
Cuban is a privilege and a pact with Fidel." Id.
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ficult.85 Because the Kuhn Directive forbids MLB teams from signing
or even speaking with any player within Cuba,"' however, Arocha's
defection posed a different problem for MLB. The question became
what to do with a Cuban national within the United States.
The special circumstances of Arocha's defection to the United
States illustrated the connection between both the United States'
policies regarding Cuba and MLB's Rules.7 Once inside the United
States, and freed from the constraints of the Kuhn Directive, Arocha
sought to maximize the benefits of the United States immigration
laws to expedite his entry into MLB.B First, Arocha immediately
sought political asylum.8 Second, Arocha relied upon the favorable
85. See Gonzalez Echevarria, supra note 13, at 187 (asserting that, as in the
United States, baseball is widely popular in Cuba because it transcends socio-
economic and ethnic differences); Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 15, at 12 (ex-
plaining that defection forces a player to choose between playing baseball, or
staying with his family). The importance of baseball in Cuban society explains
how such a difficult decision is made. See id. A well known Cuban maxim illus-
trates Cuba's obsession with baseball: "todos los ninos nacen con un guante en sus
manos." Translation: "all boys are born with a baseball glove in their hands." Id.;
Thomas Boswell, No Matter Who Wins, Castro Suffers a Loss, WASH. POST, Jan.
6, 1999, at D1 (emphasizing the importance of baseball to Cuban pride, calling it
the "sustenance" of Cuban society). Boswell illustrated the prominence of baseball
in Cuba: "[s]upremacy in international baseball events sometimes seems like the
island's only reason to smile." Id. See generally Brown, supra note 81, at 109 (elu-
cidating the rigorous structure of play in Cuban baseball). Cuban players compete
in two levels of elimination tournament play, the National Series and the Selective
Series, to determine the National Team's composition. See id. More than 10% of
Cubans play organized baseball for Cuba's 35,000 teams, and only the 20 best
players from Cuba's population of over eleven million can represent their country
for La Seleccion Nacional - the Cuban National Team. See id.; Rene Arocha re-
ceived this honor and became La Seleccion Nacional's number three starting
pitcher. See id.
86. See Kuhn Directive, supra note 69 (establishing the exclusionary policy
regarding Cuban players).
87. See Telephone Interview with William A. Murray, supra note 70 (declaring
that the post-Arocha revisions to the 1977 Kuhn Directive reaffirmed MLB's com-
pliance with the United States embargo against Cuba by emphasizing that signing
and scouting baseball players in Cuba remained forbidden).
88. See Wasem, supra note 74, at 1-3 (explaining that only Cubans possess op-
portunities to establish residency under the CAA, while other nationalities must
utilize different means).
89. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. sec. I 101(a)(24)(A) (1992),
amended by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
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terms of the United States' Cuban Adjustment Act90 ("CAA"), which
quickly enabled him to establish residency within the United States.9'
Consequently, Arocha satisfied the residency requirements of MLB's
Rules 3 and 4, which qualified him for the June Draft. 9 Due to the
special circumstances presented by Arocha's unique situation, how-
ever, MLB decided upon a special lottery-style draft, 93 with the win-
ner holding the rights to Arocha until June 1992. 94 The St. Louis Car-
dinals won the lottery drawing, and negotiated with Arocha to sign a
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 sec. 101(a)(42)(A) (setting forth
the eligibility requirements for establishing political asylum). Political asylum en-
ables aliens to remain in the United States once they establish that political perse-
cution, or fear of such persecution, would occur if they returned to the country of
nationality. See id. See generally INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-49
(1987) (identifying the various persecution standards that enable aliens to avoid
deportation, specifically that aliens need not prove that it is "more likely than not"
that a "well-founded fear of persecution" exists).
90. See Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, sec. 1, 80 Stat.
1161, 1161, amended by Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. sec. 1255, sec.
203(i), sec. 1, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 108 (1996) (declaring a policy that is
unavailable to other national groups, yet allows Cubans who reside in the United
States for at least one year to become permanent residents).
91. See Wasem, supra note 74, at 1 (explaining that under the CAA, Arocha
could establish residency in the United States after residing in the United States for
at least one year).
92. See Major League Rules, supra note 50, Rule 3 (detailing the controlling
language of MLB's residency requirement for contracts and the June Draft).
93. See Cuban Will Be Allowed to Play Major-League Baseball, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Sept. 11, 1991, at C4, available in 1991 WL 4324707 (stating that,
after an instructional league tryout, MLB employed the special lottery-style draft to
determine which team selected Arocha). See generally First-Year Player Draft
Rules, supra note 51 (explaining that MLB's First-Year Player Draft occurs each
June based upon reverse won-loss records).
94. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (providing that when a team
drafts a player, it holds the exclusive negotiating rights to that player until one
week prior to the following year's Draft, or until the player enters or returns to
college on a full-time basis); see also Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 15, at 12
(specifying that of the 26 MLB teams at the time, only eight entered the special
draft, indicating the skepticism about Arocha's age). See generally Parry Shaw,
Cuban Defector Arrojo Signs with Rays, BRANDENTON HERALD TRIB., Apr. 27,
1997, at C5, available in LEXIS, News Library (discussing Arrojo's decision to
sign with the Tampa Bay Devil Rays and the perceived doubts about his age). Be-
cause these players do not sign their own passports, and the Cuban government can
easily manipulate the age on their passports, many MLB teams doubt their verac-
ity. See id. Additionally, players are discouraged from carrying their passports,
since doing so may indicate a desire to defect. See id.
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B. EARLY VARIATIONS OF THE RENE AROCHA MODEL
Arocha's relatively easy transition and brief success in MLB il-
lustrated to other Cuban ballplayers that they too could come to
America and succeed. 96 Additionally, MLB's treatment of Arocha set
an early precedent for draffing Cuban defectors. For the players
who followed Arocha, however, the rules changed.
Instead of conducting further special lottery drafts, MLB sought to
stabilize the situation with a more familiar system!" Consequently,
MLB decided to subject all future Cuban defectors to Rule 4's June
Draft.9 Thus, when pitcher Osvaldo Fernandez and first baseman
Luis Alvarez defected soon after the 1993 June Draft, MLB required
95. See Cuban Will Be Allowed to Play Major-League Baseball, supra note 94,
at C4 (reporting that the Cardinals picked Arocha in the special lottery draft).
96. See Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 15, at 12 (characterizing Arocha's
successful first season in MLB in which he posted an 11-8 record with a 3.78
earned run average). But see Bjarkman, Lifting the Iron Curtain, supra note 15, at
31 (explaining that an arm injury prematurely ended Arocha's career with the Car-
dinals in 1993). In addition to Arocha's initial successful performance, the motiva-
tions behind his defection encouraged subsequent Cuban players to defect. See
Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 15, at 12 (explaining the reasons behind the de-
fections of Cuban baseball players). Arocha recalled: "The main reason I left was
to look for liberty. In Cuba, there isn't any. This was a way to start a new life." Id.
97. See Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 15, at 12 (characterizing MLB's
treatment of Arocha's defection as an early example of how to deal with future de-
fectors).
98. See Chass, ifi'a note 110, at 10 (explaining that MLB's policy of utilizing
a special lottery draft for defectors changed after Arocha); see also Memorandum
from William A. Murray, supra note 70 (suggesting that in addition to seeking
compliance with the United States embargo, the 1991 amendments to the Kuhn Di-
rective indicated MLB's desire to maintain fairness in the absorption of Cuban de-
fectors).
99. See Memorandum from William A. Murray, supra note 70 (explaining the
application of the evolving MLB policy towards Cuban defectors). But see Baxter
& Dominguez, supra note 15, at 12 (describing the use of a special lottery draft for
the July 1993 defection of shortstop Rey Ordonez). The New York Mets acquired
the rights to Ordonez in this special lottery draft, and later signed him in February
1994. See id.; see also Telephone Interview with Robert Lenaghan, Assistant Gen-
eral Counsel, Major League Baseball Players Association, (Mar. 1, 1999) (surmis-
ing that Ordonez' agents requested that MLB utilize a special lottery draft so that
Ordonez could start his livelihood and not wait for the next year's June Draft).
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them to wait until the 1994 June Draft to sign with a team.'0 This de-
cision stemmed in part because of the efforts of Arocha's former
teammates, shortstop Osmani Estrada and left fielder Alexis
Cabreja.101
On October 11, 1992, the two Cuban National team players de-
fected in Mexico, but decided to depart from Arocha's model. The
teammates entered the United States illegally, and instead of re-
questing political asylum,'02 they sought to sign with a MLB team as
free agents. MLB, however, objected to the idea that the two unau-
thorized aliens 3 could freely sign with any team willing to meet
their price.' 4 Additionally, the Office of the Commissioner warned
all twenty-six teams 5 that they could not sign the players until the
INS conferred work authorization. Ultimately, the players changed
100. See Chass, infra note 110, at 10 (describing the change in MLB policy re-
garding the absorption of Alvarez and Fernandez).
101. See Barry Horn, Cubans Travel Long Road to Join Rangers, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, July 11, 1993, at 7, available in 1993 WL 7986721 (tracing the path
taken by Alvarez, Cabreja, and Estrada to play in MLB).
102. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (describing the requirements of
political asylum).
103. See Immigration and Nationality Act sec. 274A(h)(3), 8 U.S.C. sec.
1324a(h)(3)(1992), amended by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546. (defining an
"unauthorized alien" who seeks employment as an alien that is neither admitted for
permanent residence nor authorized by the Attorney General to be employed
within the United States).
104. See Paul D. Staudohar, Baseball's Changing Salary Structure,
COMPENSATION & WORKING CONDITIONS, Fall 1997, at 7 (explaining that free
agents can sign with the team of their choice, and that the competitive bidding
between MLB teams escalates the salaries available for the free agents).
105. See Immigration and Nationality Act sec. 274A(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. sec.
1324 a(a)(1)(A) (describing the "knowing" requirement as one of constructive
knowledge of the alien's status). By warning all MLB teams, the Office of the
Commissioner subjected the teams to the "knowing" requirement that prevents
hiring, contracting, or recruiting an alien if they are known to be unauthorized. See
id.
106. See 8 C.F.R. sec. 274a.13(a), as amended, 55 Fed. Reg. 25937 (1990) (ex-
plaining the application process and requirements for the Employment Authoriza-
tion Documents ["EAD"]). Many aliens, including baseball players seeking asy-
lum, adjustment of status, and suspension of deportation, are required to apply for
EADs. See id. These alien baseball players require employment to gain legal status
and must apply for and receive an EAD to indicate their employment authoriza-
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their minds about obtaining free agency, and the Texas Rangers se-
lected both in the June Draft.0 7 Cabreja's and Estrada's efforts,
though, represented the first attempt by defecting Cuban baseball
players to avoid exposure in MLB's June Draft for the potentially
higher salaries of free agency.
C. JOE CUBAS AND THE "EL DUQUE" MODEL
If Arocha's defection threw MLB a curve, Joe Cubas' continuing
efforts make MLB's knees buckle."" Cubas, an agent for many Latin
American baseball players, perfected the second attempt to take ad-
vantage of MLB's Rules for his clients.'O' The agent not only assists
his players to avoid the Draft, but also allows the players to enter
MLB as high-priced free agents."
tion. See id. Additionally, these alien players must affirm, under penalty of perjury,
that they are lawfully permitted to work in the United States. See Immigration and
Nationality Act sec. 274A (b)(2), 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324(a)(b)(2) (stating that citizens
or nationals of the United States, aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence,
or aliens authorized by the INS to work in the United States must attest to their
status to work in the United States).
107. See Horn, supra note 101, at 7 (discussing MLB's refusal to allow Cabreja
and Estrada to avoid the Draft). See generally Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 15,
at 12 (describing Cabreja and Estrada's efforts to obtain unrestricted free agency).
108. See Deborah Ramirez, Joe Cubas Key Go-Between for Cuba Baseball
Hopefuls, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 5, 1998, at D5, available in LEXIS, News Library
(discussing the reputation that Cubas' earned through his efforts, and the lack of a
response by MLB). The "El Duque" model that Cubas perfected earned him quick
recognition. See Borden, supra note 76, at 3B. Cubas became notorious for ac-
quiring visas from Latin American nations to obtain free agency for his clients. See
id. See generally Gonzalez Echevarria, supra note 13, at 268-70 (describing the
efforts of Joe Cambria, who successfully recruited Cuban talent for the now de-
funct Washington Senators from the 1930s until Castro's 1960 ban on professional
sports). Gonzalez Echeverria characterizes Cubas as a modern-day Cambria. See
id. at 390.
109. See Ramirez, supra note 108, at D5 (detailing Cubas' role in the defection
of Cuban baseball players). Cubas assisted the majority of Cuban baseball defec-
tors during the 1990s. See id. Additionally, just six of his clients alone signed MLB
contracts worth approximately $30 million. See id. Bill Clark, Atlanta Braves in-
ternational scouting supervisor, summed up Cubas' importance to these Cuban de-
fectors by claiming: "h]e's made himself to Cuban baseball basically what Don
King is to the fight game. He is the self-appointed commissioner and God and eve-
rybody all rolled into one." Id.
110. See Murray Chass, Cubans Take New Route to Majors, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, Dec. 7, 1995, at 10, available in 1995 WL 9306871 (recogniz-
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Cubas rejects the Draft variants utilized to absorb players such as
Arocha, Cabreja, and Estrada into MLB."' Alternatively, Cubas ap-
plies MLB's Rules regarding foreign baseball players to Cuban
baseball defectors."' The agent directs his players to establish resi-
dency in a country other than the United States or Cuba, and then
enter the United States under either an "0" or a "P" visa."' Thus,
while these Cuban players defect, they enter MLB like other foreign
baseball players and avoid the Draft provisions of Rule 4.14 More
importantly, however, Cubas' players join MLB as wealthy baseball
players because they can negotiate with all the MLB teams as free
agents.'"'
ing Cubas' ability to assist Cuban players' defections, both logistically and finan-
cially). Cubas insists that his efforts are legal, and that he acts in a manner that is
advantageous to his clients. See id.; see also Anderson, supra note 60, at C31 (de-
tailing Cubas' recent efforts to pluck two more players from the Cuban National
team, as well as his anti-Castro stance).
111. See supra notes 77-107 and accompanying text (explaining the early 1990's
models of Cuban baseball immigration). These models consisted of players coming
to the United States, obtaining political asylum, and then becoming residents under
the CAA. See id. Once these players established residency, MLB's Rules 3 and 4
applied, and they gained exposure to the Draft. See id.
112. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (illustrating how MLB's
Rule 3(a)(1)(B) enables foreign baseball players to sign as free agents and avoid
the June Draft).
113. See supra notes 22-49, 61-65 and accompanying text (providing the appli-
cability of the "0" and "P" visas to foreign baseball players); cf United and Ant-
werp in Deal to Nurture Young Talent (last modified Mar. 27, 1999)
<http:www.soccemet.co.za/english /981116antwerp.htm> (illustrating that the Cu-
bas method of utilizing a third country to obtain residency for his foreign athlete
clients is not confined to international baseball players). In November, 1998, Eng-
land's Manchester United soccer team and Antwerp, the Belgian second division
team, signed a co-operation agreement to loan players between the two teams. See
id. Under this co-operation deal, Manchester United can take advantage of the lib-
eral work permit laws of Belgium, and obtain non-E.U. foreign talent from Africa
and South America via Antwerp. See id. If Non-E.U. players desired to directly go
to England to play soccer, the players must prove that they represent the best pro-
fessional talent and possess international experience to obtain an English work
permit for soccer. See id. Like the "El Duque" model, the deal between Manchester
United and Antwerp enables foreign athletes to meander around residency laws.
114. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text (detailing how foreign base-
ball players avoid the June Draft by complying with the provisions of MLB's Rule
3).
115. See Chass, supra note 110, at 10 (commenting on Cubas' ability to garner
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Cubas' successful clients reveal the impact of individual baseball
players upon MLB and international relations."6 During the 1997 and
1998 seasons, Cubas' clients and half-brothers Livan and Orlando
"El Duque" Hernandez won the World Series with their respective
teams." 7 While Livan's quick success highlighted the notion that op-
portunity exists for Cuban baseball players in America, "El Duque's"
romanticized defection ' provided a highly publicized narrative
among the increasing number of Cuban defections."' Additionally,
large contracts for his clients). See generally Richard Justice, New Nation, Old
Feelings: Cuban Defector Arrojo Reflects on Previous Career, WASH. POST, May
2, 1999, at D1O (explaining Cuban defector Arrojo's mixed reaction to the Orioles-
Cuba games, and detailing his adherence to the "El Duque" model which permitted
him to receive a $7 million signing bonus on his contract with the Devil Rays).
116. See Larry Rohter, Marlins Pitcher Is A Popular Hero Cuba Mlust Ignore
(last modified Oct. 19, 1997) <http:l/%vw.latinolink.comtlifellife97
/1019LBAS.HTM> (noting that the same week Cuba honored the 30th anniversary
of 1960s revolutionary Che Guevara's burial, millions of proud Cubans instead fo-
cused on Livan Hernandez' playoff performance in MLB).
117. See Jennifer Frey and Mark Maske, Marlins' Hernandez Celebrates a
Mother and Child Reunion, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1997, at D4 (commenting on
Livan Hemandez' World Series success in 1997, which enabled him to win the
World Series Most Valuable Player award); see also George Diaz, El Duque 's
American Story Turning Into Really Big Mess, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 4, 1998,
at C3, available in LEXIS, News Library (noting that "El Duque" pitched the
Yankees to another World Championship, and commenting on the veracity of his
defection story).
118. See Wertheim & Yaeger, supra note 18, at 61 (questioning the truth behind
"El Duque's" defection from Cuba); see also Eric Nunez, Fellow Refugee Disputes
"El Duque's " Escape Tale; Were Threat of Sharks, Size of Boat the Stuff Legends
are Made of?, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 6, 1998, at 8D, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary (highlighting the differences betveen "El Duque's" accounts of the voyage
and those of Juan Carlos Romero, who recently filed an $800,000 breach of oral
contract suit against "El Duque" for not helping his fellow defectors). See gener-
ally Pilot of "El Duque's" Escape Boat Says the Story Doesn 't Hold Water, SAN
DIEGo UNION-TRIB., Dec. 5, 1998, at D2, available in LEXIS, News Library (dis-
puting "El Duque's" version of his voyage, and contrasting the pitcher's financial
success with those of his co-defectors). In fact, many of the details regarding "El
Duque's" defection may have to do more with a still pending movie deal than with
what really happened. See Phil Rogers, Livan Hernande's Brother Reportedly
Going to Angels, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 8, 1998, at C5, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary (describing "El Duque's" movie deal negotiations with the Disney Com-
pany).
119. See Sue Anne Pressley, Faster Boats Carm,' Cubans, Haitians to Florida,
WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1998, at A2 (describing the plight of Cubans who defect by
boat). The year before "El Duque's" highly celebrated journey, the United States
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"El Duque's" voyage illustrated the favorable treatment afforded to
athletic defectors'2 0 despite the bilateral changes regarding Cuban
Coast Guard repatriated 406 Cubans. See id. By contrast, the year after "El
Duque's" successful voyage the Coast Guard repatriated 1,025 Cubans. See id.
Many attribute the increased number of attempted defections to the financial abil-
ity of previously successful defectors to pay professional smugglers to assist their
relatives. See id. These numbers, however, only include the Cubans detected by the
Coast Guard, and do not indicate the number of successful Cuban defections. See
id. See generally Mildrade Cherfils, Smugglers Cash In On Fleeing Cubans,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 22, 1999, available in WL, APNEWS (describing the
June 29" incident where the Coast Guard attempted to prevent fleeing Cubans from
reaching the United States shore to prevent them from taking advantage of the
CAA). The Coast Guard intercepted approximately 1,137 Cubans at sea during the
first seven months of 1999, compared with 1,047 Cubans during the entire year of
1998. See id. To stem the tide of defections, and to crack down on smugglers, the
Cuban government announced steep fines for those who use boats for illegal
smuggling. See Anita Snow, Cuba Curbs Immigrant Smuggling, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, July 22, 1999, available in WL, APNEWS (explaining that the new Cuban
law is designed to prevent smuggling and another mass exodus). See generally
Marcus, infra note 121 (explaining that some South Florida smuggling rings
charge as much as $9,000 to smuggle in one person).
120. See Dominczyk, supra note 49, at 181-84 (describing the special treatment
afforded talented athletes by the United States); see also Wertheim & Yaeger, su-
pra note 18, at 62-63 (detailing the sea voyage made by "El Duque," and the spe-
cial assistance provided by the United States Coast Guard). Presumably because of
his international reputation as a fantastic pitcher, "El Duque's" defection received
fortuitous, if not favorable treatment from the United States to hurt the Castro re-
gime. See id.; see also Kaufman, infra note 122 (castigating the United States for
its favorable treatment of immigrating athletes); Moffett, infra note 122 (explain-
ing the favorable treatment afforded to Cuban baseball players over other Cubans,
and over other Latin American refugees because of the damaging political impli-
cations to the Castro government); cf Bonnie DeSimone, Future Uncertain for
Cuban Defectors, CHI. TRIB., May 3, 1998, at C7, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary (describing the immigration accord between the Bahamas and Cuba, which
holds that the Bahamas will repatriate Cuban defectors, unless the United Nations
High Commission on Refugees rules that the defectors are victims of political per-
secution). See generally Harold Hongju Koh, America's Offshore Refugee Camps,
29 U. RCH. L. REv. 139, 156-57 (1994) (describing that under the terms of the
1994 Clinton-Castro Communique, the Coast Guard repatriates Cubans attempting
to defect by sea). See Joint Communique on Migration, Sept. 9, 1994, United
States-Cuba, reprinted in 71 Interpreter Releases 1236 (Sept. 12, 1994). Thus,
when the Coast Guard rescued "El Duque" and his group from being stranded on
an island while repatriating three other Cubans, "El Duque" feared repatriation as
well. Wertheim & Yaeger, supra note 18, at 62. Instead of repatriating "El Duque"
and his fellow defectors, the Coast Guard secretly shifted the group to another ship
that eventually rerouted the group to Freeport, in the Bahamas. See id. After re-
ceiving this auxiliary assistance from the Coast Guard, the group flew to the Car-
michael Road Detention Facility in Nassau. See id.
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immigration to the United States.' More importantly, however, "El
Duque's" prominent defection epitomized that the connection be-
tween United States immigration laws and MLB's Rules'"- can lead
121. See David L. Marcus, Legal Chaos Leaves Cuban Refigees Adrift, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 2, 1998, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File (ex-
plaining that, after more than 30,000 Cubans travelling by raft arrived in the sum-
mer of 1994, the Clinton Administration sought changes in the absorption of Cu-
ban refugees); see also Koh, supra note 120, at 156 (describing the safe haven
facilities used for absorbing Cuban and Haitian refugees and the initial changes
with respect to Cuban defections after the 1994 Clinton-Castro Communique). In-
stead of allowing Cuban defectors to enter the United States, this bilateral effort
sent the Cuban defectors to detention centers. See id. See generally INS Announces
Third Special Cuban Migration Program (last modified June 5, 1998) <http'J/
www.usia.gov/regional/ar/us-cub/lotrel.htm> (detailing the eligibility and registra-
tion requirements for the Special Cuban Migration Program ["SCMP"] that allows
Cubans to legally register for migration to the United States). The SCMP stems
from the 1994 United States-Cuban migration agreement that enables the legal mi-
gration of 20,000 Cubans to the United States per year. See id. Under the terms of
the 1995 Cuban Migration Agreement, however, the treacherous boat defections
became even more difficult for prospective Cuban defectors. See generally
Wasem, supra note 74, at 8. Under this agreement, the United States immediately
repatriates Cubans travelling by sea instead of placing them in safe haven camps.
See id. Still, the United States continues its efforts to issue 20,000 visas to Cubans
each year. See id.; see also Tom Maloney, Cuban Could Prove AL Answer To
Nomo, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 1, 1995, at D2, available in LEXIS, News
Library (describing how the immigration policy annually allowing 20,000 Cuban
refugees to emigrate to the United States assisted Cuban National Team pitcher
Ariel Prieto's April, 1995 defection). Once Prieto legally came to the United
States, he established residency, and the Commissioner's Office placed him in the
June Draft where the Oakland Athletics selected the pitcher. See id. Prieto's path to
MLB provides another example how changes in United States immigration policy
can affect the players available to MLB teams. See id.
122. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text (noting that MLB teams
utilize international scouting programs to sign the best foreign baseball players,
since MLB's Rules permit these players to enter MLB as free agents); see also
Wertheim & Yaeger, supra note 18, at 63 (disclosing the reasoning behind "El
Duque's" refusal of an American humanitarian parole visa). While some believe
that "El Duque" refused the humanitarian visa because his friends were not offered
the same opportunity, many others claim that he rejected the humanitarian visa for
the chance to sign a large contract with a MLB team. See id. See generally Sashi
Kaufman, Multi-Million Dollar Immigration Exception, (visited Jan. 27, 1998)
<http://www.coha.orglopeds/BASEBALL.html> (chastising the United States for
offering "El Duque" an humanitarian visa because of his pitching prowess, and as-
serting that favorable immigration treatment to athletes makes a mockery of United
States immigration laws); Dan Moffett, Baseball Skills Seem to Grant Cuban Im-
migrants Preference, Cox NEWS SERVICE, (last modified Mar. 24, 1998)<http://
www.latinolink.com/news/news98/0324nimi.htm> (explaining that within the al-
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to a lucrative free agent contract."'
Both "El Duque's" pitching performances and his circuitous arri-
val to the United States illustrate his penchant for navigating his way
through difficult situations.2 4 While many American players emulate
his pitching style, many Cuban players emulate his path into MLB.',
For these Cuban baseball players, "El Duque's" path provides a
model for success."' While the specifics of defection remain difficult
and dangerous, players opting to defect no longer choose the Arocha
ready politically favored group of Cuban immigrants who rely on the CAA, a
newly developed subgroup of baseball players receives further favorable treat-
ment). According to lawyers with the Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center in Mi-
ami, the humanitarian parole visa rejected by "El Duque" is an extremely rare
method of entry that allows refugees to quickly enter the United States to escape
persecution. See id.; see also Editorial: Our Effective, Intelligent and Calm Re-
sponse, (visited August 1, 1999) <http://www. granma.cu/ingles/julio5/037-i.html>
(explaining the Cuban government's assertion that the CAA encourages Cubans to
defect, and is part of a continuing effort by the United States to undermine the Cu-
ban government).
123. See Rogers, supra note 118, at C5 (characterizing "El Duque's" work in
Cuba prior to his defection). "El Duque's" refusal of the American visa makes fi-
nancial sense. See id.; Phil Rogers, "El Duque" Showcases Quality of Cuban
Baseball, CHI. TRIB., June 14, 1998, at C5, available in LEXIS, News Library (ex-
plaining that in retribution for his half-brother's defection, Cuba suspended "El
Duque" from baseball). During his suspension, "El Duque" toiled for over a year
as a janitor at a mental hospital, making roughly $10 a month. See id.; Cuban
Baseball Player Accepts Japan's Offer of Asylum, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Apr. 3, 1998,
at B2, available in LEXIS, News Library (illustrating that by becoming a free
agent, "El Duque" received a considerable raise by signing a $6.6 million dollar
contract with the New York Yankees.
124. See William Gildea, Yankees Try to Do One Better: Clemens Gives Boost
to Champs, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1999, at D9 (discussing the Yankees' addition of
pitcher Roger Clemens, and "El Duque's" important pitching performances during
critical junctions in the 1998 playoffs).
125. See Tom Farrey, Traitor to the Heart, (last modified Feb. 24, 1998)
<http://espn.go.com/gen/columns/farrey/0 1121832.html> (explaining the difficult
journey of Maikel Jova and four other Cuban defectors to MLB, and the players'
continued adherence to the "El Duque" model after initial failures).
126. See Sue Anne Pressley, Five More Baseball Players Leave Cuba: Defec-
tions Come on Castro's Birthday, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1998, at A3 (recognizing
that subsequent Cuban defectors will follow the "El Duque" model for large free
agent contracts and commenting that recent defectors sought to maximize Castro's
embarrassment by defecting on the Cuban leader's birthday). See generally Farrey,
supra note 125 (averring that the worsening conditions of Cuban baseball infuriate
many Cuban players, and cause further resentment among Cuban fans toward the
Castro government).
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model of direct defection from Cuba to the United States.'2' Instead,
by adhering to the "El Duque" model,' ' these defecting playersI2
will seek residency in a third country to avoid the United States' con-
ferral of residency under the CAA'"0 and the subsequent exposure to
MLB's Rule 4 Draft.' Forgoing MLB's Draft provides players the
opportunity to quickly sign a multi-million dollar contract with the
team of their choice.'32 By escaping Cuba, the CAA, and MLB's Rule
4 Draft, however, these players subject themselves to MLB's own
economic thicket. "3 Thus, while following "El Duque's" model en-
ables these players to alleviate their own financial problems, it also
serves to exacerbate the fiscal problems plaguing MLB.
D. How THE "EL DUQUE" MODEL HURTS MLB
La Manera Cubana represents a reaction to the deepening eco-
nomic crisis in Cuba. M For Cuban baseball players mired in the mid-
dle of a sagging economy, the lure of a well paid career in MLB
127. See supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text (defining the Rene Arocha
model, and illustrating that players under this model directly defect to the United
States, and become exposed to all MLB teams through the Draft).
128. See supra notes 109, 122-24 and accompanying text (asserting that players
can sign large free agent contracts with MLB teams by following the "El Duque"
model).
129. See Anthony Breznican, Teen-Age Cuban Player Defects, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, April 16, 1999, available in WL, APNEWS (detailing the defection of Cu-
ban catcher Bryan Pena, and his adherance to the "El Duque" model).
130. See Wasem, supra note 74, at 1-5 (explaining that under the CAA, Cuban
defectors can achieve United States residency after one year).
131. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (describing the application of
the Rule 4 Draft).
132. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (detailing the ability of in-
ternational players to immediately sign large contracts as free agents, rather than
limiting their bargaining rights to one team, which occurs when the player is sub-
ject to the Draft).
133. See infra note 140-145 and accompanying text (discussing the financial
state of MLB, and asserting that only a few wealthy teams can afford the talent
necessary to compete).
134. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (commenting on the relation-
ship between deteriorating economic conditions in Cuba, and the desire of Cuban
baseball players to compete in MLB).
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proves tempting.' 3 While Arocha's pioneering step began a new
wave of Cuban baseball immigration, the "El Duque" model found a
way to meander through the United States immigration laws and
MLB's Rules. 36 In so doing, the "El Duque" model widens the gap
between the wealthy and less profitable baseball teams.
3 7
Future defecting Cuban players will seek to parallel both the on-
the-field and financial success of the Cuban players who defected be-
fore them.'38 Many defecting Cuban players carefully decide where to
play, yet, even before these players defect, many MLB teams are left
out this decision.' Unfortunately, while all MLB teams are aware of
the abundance of talent in Cuba, only a few of them possess the fi-
nancial ability to sign Cuban players.
40
135. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (detailing the struggling Cu-
ban economy and the desires of Cuban players to improve their own financial con-
dition); see also Bjarkman, Cuba: Four Decades, supra note 15, at 14 (explaining
that the large salaries of MLB players provide an appealing alternative for the
many amateur Cuban baseball players who are poorly paid despite possessing
MLB skills).
136. See supra notes 108-110, 113-115 (explaining how agent Joe Cubas uses
the "El Duque" model to provide large free agent contracts for Cuban defectors by
weaving between MLB's Rules and United States immigration laws).
137. See Sean McAdam, The Rich Get Richer and... (last modified Feb. 4,
1999) <http://espn.go.com/mlb/state/daythree.html> (describing the correlation
between victories and team payroll, and explaining the difficulties that small-
revenue teams have in competing).
138. See supra notes 77-132 and accompanying text (describing the manner and
reasons behind the defection of Cuban baseball players). When faced with the stark
choice between remaining with their family and country, or gaining financial sta-
bility and a place on an MLB team, many players opt for the latter choice. See id.
139. See infra notes 140-145 and accompanying text (describing how teams
without vast financial resources or nearby Cuban communities face enormous ob-
stacles in their attempts to sign Cuban free agents).
140. See Lockwood, supra note 19, at D5 (discussing the disparity between the
wealthy and less profitable MLB teams in their ability to sign free agents); see also
Staudohar, supra note 104, at 6 (explaining that the widening gap between wealthy
and poor teams, and the their ability to sign free agents, does not necessarily con-
form to the geographically-based dichotomy between large-market and small-
market teams). See generally McAdam, supra note 137 (observing that in the 1998
off-season, the first thirty free agents received on average a 64% salary raise).
Only eight teams, however, accounted for over three-quarters of the raises, illus-
trating the ability of wealthy teams to exclude poorer teams from signing free
agents. See id.
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This financial and competitive disadvantage also extends to the
international scouting efforts of MLB teams.'4' The few teams with
the financial ability to readily locate international talent, such as the
Atlanta Braves, Los Angeles Dodgers, and New York Yankees, con-
tinually drive up the already hyper-inflated free agent market." The
financial ability of these MLB teams to find the best international
talent also enables them to sign more free agents."' Without the fi-
141. See Beaton, supra note 82, at 22C (illustrating that at least five MLB or-
ganizations cannot afford to operate extensive Latin American scouting or devel-
opment programs); see also Lockwood, supra note 19, at D5 (commenting on the
importance of international scouting programs, and noting the inability of poorer
MLB teams to compete with the international efforts of wealthier teams). See gen-
erally McAdam, supra note 137 (supporting the notion that poorer teams are at a
financial disadvantage in international scouting efforts). Terry Ryan, General
Manager for the struggling Minnesota Twins, bemoaned that the dramatic increase
in international signing, scouting, and development costs in the past decade magni-
fies the disparity between wealthy and poor teams. See id. According to Ryan,
wealthy teams can spend more than three times what poorer teams spend to scout
and sign the best international talent. See id.
142. See Mark Maske, Orioles to Pay' Most in Luxuy' Tar, WASH. POST, Jan. 9,
1999, at D1 (explaining the luxury tax system used by MLB). In 1996, after the
MLB owners failed to implement a salary cap on team payrolls, they agreed to
utilize a payroll-taxation system to provide spending restraints. See id. The money
generated from the payroll tax goes to MLB's central revenue fund, and is redis-
tributed in an effort to level the financial disparity among MLB teams. See id.; see
also Paul H. Staudohar, Salary Caps in Professional Team Sports, COMPENSATION
& WORKING CONDITIONS, Spring 1998, at 9 [hereinafter Staudohar, Salari
, 
Caps in
Professional Team Sports] (explaining that in 1998, teams paid a 35% tax on pay-
rolls exceeding $55 million). In 1999, teams will pay a 34% tax on team payrolls
exceeding $58.9 million. See id. There will be no luxury tax on salaries, however,
in the 2000 season. See id. Part of the revenue-sharing agreement implemented by
the negotiators for MLB and the MLB Players Association also included a 2.5%
tax on individual player salaries. See id. MLB officials anticipate that this individ-
ual player salary tax, coupled with the revenues gained from the luxury tax and the
partial sharing of local broadcasting revenues from large-market teams, should re-
direct about $70 million to 13 small-market teams to bolster their competitiveness.
See Staudohar, supra note 104, at 9. But see Kurt Badenhausen & William Sicheri,
Baseball Games, FORBES MAGAZINE, May 31, 1999, at 112, 117 (stating that
MLB's revenue-sharing system punishes teams with high payrolls who attempt to
win, yet rewards teams with low payrolls and no chance of winning). Ironically,
teams like the Mets and Dodgers, who increased their payrolls in an effort to bol-
ster their competitiveness, lost money through the revenue-sharing system. See id.
at 116. Meanwhile, teams like the Marlins and Expos netted profits, despite drasti-
cally reducing their payrolls. See id.
143. See Bill Shaikin, Angels Take Small International Step: The Inroad into
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nancial ability to pay for these international free agents, however, the
ability of poorer teams to sign Cuban ballplayers hinges solely upon
the appeal of a nearby Cuban community for the individual player.144
Thus, with many Cuban players going to the highest bidders, or to
teams in areas with large Cuban populations, the potential Cuban tal-
ent pool will continue to remain confined to only a limited number of
teams.' 5 This can only serve to diminish the competitiveness of
MLB, and widen the gulf between the wealthy and poor baseball
teams. 146 By further damaging the ability of many small market teams
Mexico Doesn't Overcome Their Developmental Absence in Other Latin American
Countries, THE RIVERSIDE PRESS-ENTER., Sept. 10, 1996, at D1, available in 1996
WL 10301000 (detailing the importance of successful international programs for
several MLB teams, and explaining that signing bonuses given to some players by
wealthy teams can exceed the entire international scouting budget of poorer clubs).
144. See 1990 Census Data (visited Aug. 7, 1998) <http://ww
w.Census.gov/population/socdemo/hispanic/cps97/tabO1-1.txt> (disclosing the
Cuban population in American cities and states). A breakdown of Cuban popula-
tion by state illustrates that the California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas
teams garner support from their respective Cuban populations, and consequently,
the teams in these areas likely possess a cultural edge in signing Cuban players.
See id. Previous free agent Cuban players signed either with rich baseball clubs, or
leaned towards the areas with large Cuban populations. See Peter Bjarkman, Myth
and Mystety Are Bywords of Cuban Baseball, INT'L BASEBALL RUNDOWN, Aug.
1998, at 11 (detailing MLB teams that signed free agent defectors in the 1990s).
Because Cuban players frequently seek to play in cities with a large Cuban popu-
lace, the presence of a nearby Cuban population is important for MLB teams
seeking to sign Cuban defectors. See Beard, supra note 74, at C4 (detailing the de-
fections of Cuban athletes at the Central American and Caribbean Games and ex-
plaining that the defectors chose certain cities based upon their Spanish speaking
community). Livan Hernandez found Miami's large Cuban population an integral
factor in his decision to sign with the Florida Marlins. See Dick Kaegel, Livan
Living It Up: Two World Series Victories Make Florida's Hernandez a Hero in the
U.S. and Cuba, KAN. CITY STAR, Oct. 25, 1997, at Dl, available in LEXIS, News
Library. See also Shaw, supra note 94, at C5 (describing the importance of Flor-
ida's Cuban community to Arrojo's decision to sign with the Devil Rays).
145. See Bjarkman, supra note 144, at 11 (noting the teams that signed Cuban
free agents in the 1990s); see also McAdam, supra note 137 (explaining that both
money and a local Cuban community affect a Cuban players' choice when decid-
ing where to sign).
146. See McAdam, supra note 137 (concluding that wealthy teams are immedi-
ately placed in an advantageous position with respect to free agent signings).
Wealthy teams are able to sign expensive free agents, scout the world for the top
talent, and retain their best players through contract extensions. See id. By contrast,
small market teams struggle to keep their best players, and they are ill-equipped to
find the best prospects to fill the place of their departed high-priced players. See id.
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to compete, 4 7 the net appeal of MLB suffers.'
Enabling all MLB teams to display the world's best baseball talent
can produce profound implications beyond the playing field. Jackie
Robinson's 1947 entry into MLB broke baseball's invidious exclu-
sion of African-Americans,'4 9 and years later permitted African-
Americans to compete throughout MLB.'o Off the field, Robinson's
heroic struggle eventually changed the political landscape and
sparked legislation that re-evaluated race-relations in American soci-
ety.' Forty-four years after Robinson's pioneering entry into MLB,
Rene Arocha's defection from an economy ravaged by the demise of
147. See McAdam, supra note 137 (delineating that during the last eight sea-
sons, the correlation between payroll and won-loss records became more apparent).
148. See id. (cautioning that a grave situation exists for MLB when over half the
teams cannot provide the possibility of fielding a contending team).
149. See Peter Bjarkman, History's Many Shades: Tracking Jackie's Latino
Predecessors, PRIMERA FILA, Oct. 1997, at 12, 13 (discussing the incredible op-
portunities that Robinson's efforts provided for future minority baseball players).
Although Robinson is credited with breaking baseball's odious color barrier in
1947, several Latino players preceded him in MLB, yet have received little recog-
nition for their efforts. See id.
150. See James R. Devine, The Past as Moral Guide to the Present: The Paral-
lel Between Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Elements of a Nonviolent Civil Rights Cam-
paign and Jackie Robinson's Entry onto the Brooklyn Dodgers, 3 VILL. SPORTS &
ENT. L. FORuM 489, 514 (1996) (remarking that MLB was extremely slow to inte-
grate); see also ARTHUR ASHE, A HARD ROAD TO GLORY: A HISTORY OF THE
AFRICAN-AMERICAN ATHLETE SINCE 1946 3-4 (1993) (commenting on the slow
pace of integration within MLB). From 1947 to 1953, the National League added
African American players at a dismal rate of three players every two years, while
the American League was even slower by adding one player every two years. See
id. As late as 1959, twelve years after Robinson began his career with the Dodgers,
an unwritten limit on the number of African-American players per team still ex-
isted. See id. at 44-45. But see Baseball Notes: Minority Push, WASH. POST, Apr.
25, 1999, at D12 (explaining that MLB Commissioner Selig seeks to increase mi-
nority hiring for general manager and manager positions).
151. See J. Gordon Hylton, American Civil Rights Laws and the Legacy of
Jackie Robinson, 8 MARQ. SPORTS L.J 387, 388-89 (1998)(discussing Robinson's
effect upon Civil Rights legislation). Shortly after Robinson's signing, President
Truman formed the Committee on Civil Rights, which had the power to investigate
violations of African American's rights and recommend legislation to rectify
similar abuses. See id. at 388. Furthermore, Truman desegregated the United States
Armed Forces in 1948. See id. Eventually, these efforts and many others culmi-
nated in the groundbreaking Voting Rights Act of 1965. See Voting Rights Act of
1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. secs. 1971,
1973 to 1973bb-1(1994)).
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the Cold War rekindled a Cuban presence in MLB. "' The establish-
ment of the "El Duque" model, however, prevents any significant
future Cuban presence throughout MLB because of MLB's own eco-
nomic conditions and the hostile international relations between the
United States and Cuba.'53 Accordingly, MLB must pitch an effective
Baseball Diplomacy to change the "El Duque" model.'54 The incen-
tive for MLB to implement an effective Baseball Diplomacy depends
on whether such a proposal can fairly distribute Cuban talent' to ad-
dress MLB's own economic problems of disparity,' and whether the
proposal provides MLB the historic opportunity to address the larger
issue of United States-Cuba relations.
5 7
152. See supra notes 83-97 and accompanying text (describing Arocha's moti-
vations for defecting and his pioneering role as the first Cuban baseball player to
defect in the 1990's).
153. See supra notes 3-5, 76, 135-148 and accompanying text (examining the
heightened tensions between the United States and Cuba, and explaining how the
"El Duque" model exacerbates MLB's economic conditions and further sours
United States-Cuba relations).
154. See infra notes 221-266 and accompanying text (setting forth four compo-
nents of an effective Baseball Diplomacy).
155. See infra note 172 and accompanying text (asserting that within both the
Kuhn Directive and its 1991 amendments, MLB expressed a desire to create a
system that permits all MLB teams to have equal access to Cuban players).
156. See supra notes 137-148 and accompanying text (explaining that the "El
Duque" model exacerbates the differences between wealthy and poor MLB teams
in terms of signing and scouting international talent, and competing in the stand-
ings).
157. See Joseph A. Manero, Play Ball With Cuba?, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1999,
at A27 (criticizing President Clinton for failing to cancel the Orioles-Cuba exhibi-
tion series, as well as MLB Commissioner Selig's view of the series). Commis-
sioner Selig expressed his hopes that through the exhibition series, MLB could
transcend baseball by promoting productive ties between Cubans and Americans.
See id.; see also infra notes 167-171, 173 and accompanying text (illustrating
MLB's efforts to forge a better relationship with Cuba through Baseball Diplo-
macy); supra notes 5, 14 (discussing the use of the Orioles-Cuban National Team
series as a creative way to increase contacts between the Cuban and American
people). See generally supra notes 149-151 and accompanying text (explaining
that despite MLB's slow pace of integration, enabling Robinson to compete al-
lowed MLB to spark changes in American race relations). The effective Baseball
Diplomacy proposals discussed in Section IV aim to similarly improve relations
between the United States and Cuba through MLB. See infra notes 221-266 and
accompanying text (detailing the four steps of an effective Baseball Diplomacy).
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III. BASEBALL AND UNITED STATES-CUBA
RELATIONS
A. EARLY BASEBALL DIPLOMACY
Almost a century before Fidel Castro took power, the relationship
between the United States and Cuba bonded through baseball when
American-educated Cuban students and United States Marines
brought baseball equipment to Cuba.' Since those first games in
Cuba, baseball became a common ground that continues to connect
the Cuban and American people.'9 Despite this common ground,
however, rancorous political differences continue to stymie United
States-Cuban relations,'4 and keep the populations of the two nations
apart.
This enmity arose in early 1960, when the Cuban government na-
tionalized all United States business and commercial properties in
Cuba.' 6' That same year, the Castro government banned Cuban ath-
158. See Gonzalez Echevarria, supra note 13, at 82-90 (demonstrating how the
American-schooled Cuban Nemesio Guillot brought baseball equipment to Cuba in
1864, and how the United States Marines helped spread the game throughout Latin
America). The popularity of baseball in Cuba grew because of the close socio-
economic relations with the United States, and because the game provided a way
of rejecting the vestiges of Spanish authority. See id. at I 11-12.; Rob Neyer, Time-
line: Baseball and Cuba (last modified Mar. 26, 1999)
<http:llwww.espn.go.com/mlb/features /01181193. html> (describing that the first
baseball game in Cuba with Cuban participation took place in 1866).
159. See Serge Kovaleski, Cuba's Major League Welcome: Nation Embraces
Visiting Orioles, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1999, at A6 (asserting that baseball links
the people of the United States and Cuba); see also Beaton, supra note 19, at 22C
(listing the current players of Cuban heritage within MLB organizations); Serge F.
Kovaleski, Diplomacy On A Smaller Scale: Despite Losses to Cuban Youths,
Area's Young Athletes Savor Trip, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1999, at B I (describing
the trip of 80 Washington-Baltimore area young baseball players to Cuba, and the
personal exchanges with their Cuban counterparts).
160. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (characterizing the political po-
larization within the United States regarding relations towards Cuba); see also su-
pra note 4 and accompanying text (detailing the United States' political responses
to the Castro government, including a brief examination of the Helms-Burton Act);
supra note 17 and accompanying text (identifying the key events in United States-
Cuba relations since 1959).
161. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining the history of the
United States embargo against Cuba); see also Where Are Ve Heading?, supra
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letes from competing in professional sports,' which effectively
ended the prominence of new Cuban-trained talent in MLB 163 until
Arocha's defection.' 64 Before Arocha's defection, however, the
United States made several attempts in the 1970s to improve rela-
tions with Cuba through baseball.'65 These attempts revealed the in-
ternal divisions and political differences within both MLB and the
United States government, which ultimately caused early Baseball
Diplomacy efforts to fail.
16
note 9, at 2-5 (statement of Michael Ranneberger) (describing the Clinton Admini-
stration's proposals to increase bilateral people-to-people contacts in an effort to
promote democratic change). The United States implemented an embargo against
Cuba when the Cuban government confiscated the property of thousands of
American individuals and companies, and failed to provide compensation. See id.
at 5 (indicating that the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission cer-
tified 5,911 valid claims against the Cuban government by United States nation-
als). See generally Alejandre v. Cuba, No. 96-10126, 96-10127, 96-10128, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4137, at *16 (discussing the Treasury Department's Office of
Foreign Assets Control promulgation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations
which implemented the embargo pursuant to the Trading With the Enemy Act of
1917).
162. See Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 15, at 12 (relating that Castro's ban
on professional sports prevented Cubans from competing in MLB).
163. See supra notes 15, 80 and accompanying text (describing the history of
Cuban players in MLB history).
164. See supra notes 80-100 and accompanying text (describing Arocha's de-
fection, and MLB's initial treatment of defecting Cuban baseball players).
165. See Milton Jamail, Orioles Not First To Seek Showcase Visit To Cuba (last
modified Mar. 29, 1999) <http://usatoday.com/sports/baseball/bbw/v53/bbw5319
.htm> (delineating the attempts at Baseball Diplomacy during the 1970s). Similar
attempts to forge closer ties between Cubans and Americans occurred before the
Orioles exhibition game in Havana. See generally Secret Cuba Visit: Sliding Under
the Radar, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 22, 1999, at 36 (describing the clandestine
trip of a Long Island softball team that played several Cuban softball teams in early
March 1999); Mark Alan Teirstein, Local Teams Beat Orioles To Cuba: Greeley,
Eastchester Played Series of Games On Visit in '83, JOURNAL NEWS Mar. 27,
1999, at 2C (describing the games played by the first high school baseball teams to
visit Cuba since the 1959 revolution).
166. See Jamail, supra note 165 (describing the efforts by four MLB teams to
play in Cuba during the 1970s). In 1971, the San Diego Padres' Cuban-born man-
ager, Preston Gomez, sought to bring a MLB All-Star team to compete in Cuba,
but the United States State Department denied his request. See id. In 1976, Secre-
tary of State Henry Kissinger cancelled a United States-Cuba game in Havana be-
cause of Cuba's military participation in the Angolan civil war. See id. In 1977,
however, the Houston Astros surreptitiously held baseball clinics in Cuba and
scouted Cuban players. See Telephone Interview With Milton Jamail, infra note
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Prior to issuing the 1977 Directive that forbids scouting Cuban
baseball players, former MLB Commissioner Bowie Kuhn promoted
the idea of Baseball Diplomacy to the State Department.I" Kuhn's
correspondence suggested that the Cubans desired to compete within
MLB, and that baseball could provide the appropriate medium for
promoting American values to the Cuban people.'6 ' Internal State
Department memoranda indicated that, much like the 1971 Ping-
Pong Diplomacy with China, 69 baseball games with Cuba could
193; see also Milton Jamail, FULL COUNT: AN INSIDE VIEW OF CUBAN BASEBALL
AND THE UNITED STATES (forthcoming Spring, 2000) (detailing the early attempts
at Baseball Diplomacy and the 1977 visit by the Astros). In 1977, MLB also issued
the Kuhn Directive, which prohibited MLB teams from interacting with Cuban
players. Kuhn Directive, supra note 69. This MLB policy stemmed in part from the
Los Angeles Dodgers' objection to the rival Yankees' attempts to play in Havana.
Jamail, supra note 165. See generally Justice, supra note 6, at D4 (explaining that
MLB invited all 30 teams to send a representative to Havana during the Orioles
exhibition game to prevent any possible advantage that the Orioles stood to gain in
signing future defectors). But see Speaking Out, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 1999, at D3
(providing the suggestion of one MLB team owner that Orioles owner Peter An-
gelos' only interest in the exhibition games with Cuba lay in a desire to sign Cuban
defectors and establish a niche within Cuba for this purpose).
167. See Letter from Bowie K. Kuhn, Commissioner, MLB, to Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger (Jan. 14, 1975) (visited Mar. 29, 1999)
<http://www.seas.gwu.edulnsarchive/NSAEBBfNSAEBB12/docs01-0 l.htm>
(relaying early efforts to organize an exhibition baseball series, having both home
and away games, with the Cuban government's sports agency, Insituto Nacional de
Deportes Educacion Fisica y Recreacion ["INDER"]).
168. See Briefing Memorandum from William D. Rogers, Department of State
to the Secretary of State (Jan. 21, 1975)(visited Mar.
29,1999)<http://wwv.seas.gvu.edutnsarchive//SAEBBiNSAEBB I 2idocsd04-
01.htm> (detailing Rogers' correspondence and conversations with Kuhn, and
Kuhn's strong desire to see Baseball Diplomacy materialize). Kuhn felt that "Cu-
ban players [want] to look forward to the opportunity to play some day in our ma-
jor leagues." Id. Additionally, Kuhn sought to use baseball's "magic value in pro-
jecting a positive image of the U.S." Id.
169. See Memorandum from William D. Rogers & Culver Gleysteen, Depart-
ment of State, Additional Talking Points on Sending a Baseball Team to Cuba
(Feb. 19, 1975)(visited Mar. 29, 1999) <http://wwwv.seas.gwu.edufnsarchive
/NSAEBB/NSAEBB12/docs/09-01.htm> [hereinafter Rogers & Gleysteen Memo-
randum] (discussing the parallel of playing baseball with Cuba to the Ping-Pong
Diplomacy efforts with China). Additionally, Rogers and Eagleburger suggested
that a baseball game could promote better relations with Cuba by "bridging the gap
between the Bay of Pigs and a new relationship with Castro." Id. See generally
Ramsey, supra note 16 (asserting that Ping-Pong Diplomacy helped the United
States and China overcome their bilateral hostility).
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forge a new relationship with the Cuban people,77 and remain dis-
tinct from the political relations between Washington and Havana."'
Despite Kuhn's efforts to organize games in Cuba, 7 2 however, the
State Department rejected the Baseball Diplomacy proposal. ' In-
stead of seizing the opportunity in the 1970s to improve United
States-Cuba relations through baseball, the high profile defections of
Cuban players in the 1990s allowed baseball to embitter bilateral re-
lations. 74
170. See Bowie K. Kuhn, Outline of Cuban Exhibition Game Proposal (June 13,
1975) (visited Mar. 29, 1999) <http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB12/docs/15-01.htm> (articulating Kuhn's proposal for exhibition baseball
games between the United States and Cuba). Kuhn believed that the games would
promote better relations between MLB and Cuban baseball in a non-political man-
ner that would reach the people of the two nations. See id.
171. See id. (discussing the non-political nature of the proposed baseball
games); see also Letter from William D. Rogers, Department of State to Henry K.
Kissinger, Secretary of State, Kuhn's Efforts Continue (Feb. 13, 1975) (visited
Mar. 29, 1999) <http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/NSAEBB /NSAEBBI2
/docs/06-Ol.htm> (explaining that any possible games between the United States
and Cuba could be separated from United States relations with Cuba); Rogers &
Gleysteen Memorandum, supra note 169 (suggesting the difficulty that Cuban ex-
iles and Cuban-Americans would encounter if they protested the proposed games).
Nonetheless, the two officials asserted that baseball games could help eradicate
Cuban hatred of America, as well as reestablish relations with the Castro govern-
ment. See id.
172. See Kuhn Directive, supra note 69, at 1 (explaining the Kuhn Directive that
became MLB policy after the failed attempts at Baseball Diplomacy). The Kuhn
Directive expresses Kuhn's hopes of modifying MLB's policy regarding Cuban
players, provided that such a system permits fair access to Cuban players. See id.;
see also Memorandum from William A. Murray, supra note 70 (suggesting that if
changes in the United States embargo permit modifications in MLB's Cuban pol-
icy, they will occur in an equitable fashion).
173. See Secret/NODIS/Eyes Only Briefing Memorandum from William D.
Rogers, Department of State, Henry K. Kissenger, Secretary of State (Feb. 24,
1975) (visited Mar. 29, 1999) <http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB12/docs/10-01.htm> (explaining that Rogers canceled the proposed
Baseball Diplomacy at Kissenger's behest because the Ford Administration did not
want to squander political support for their policy towards Cuba). According to the
memorandum, Kuhn realized the political problems behind the proposal, but re-
mained hopeful for a future attempt. See id.
174. See supra notes 82-85, 116-119 and accompanying text (discussing the de-
fections of Cuban baseball players in the 1990s and Castro's animosity towards
these defectors).
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B. UNITED STATES-CUBA RELATIONS AFTER AROCHA
Rene Arocha's foray into MLB followed the tenor of existing
United States-Cuban relations. 175 The larger forces of Cuba's strug-
gling economy,' 76 coupled with the appeal of lucrative MLB sala-
ries,177 heavily influenced Arocha's defection and the desires of other
Cuban baseball players to defect.17' This rebirth of a Cuban-trained
presence in MLB coincided with several external events that drasti-
cally affected United States-Cuban relations.'
Following the arrival of these Cuban players, legislative develop-
ments in the United States hastened the collapse of the Cuban econ-
175. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (explaining the hostile nature
of the bilateral relations between Cuba and the United States during the last forty
years).
176. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (asserting that the end of So-
viet support led to a drastic decline in the Cuban economy). See generally U.S.-
Cuba Commission: U.S.-Cuba History, supra note 78 (noting the termination of
Soviet support); Where Are We Heading?, supra note 9, at 2 (statement of Michael
Ranneberger) (discussing the dismal state of the Cuban economy due to the low
prices of nickel and sugar, and the reduced value of exports). But see Cuba An-
nounces 6.1 Percent Growth, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 7, 1999, available in WL,
APNEWS (relaying Cuban Vice President Carlos Lage's assertion that the im-
proved sugar and tourism industries bolstered Cuba's economy in the first half of
1999).
177. See Yankees Payroll Tops $85 AM, (last modified Apr. 6, 1999)
<http:llespn.go.com/mlb/news/1999/990406/01196184.html> (identifying that
baseball's average salary for 1999 is 19% higher than 1998's average salary, at a
record $1,720,050 per year).
178. See Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 15, at 12 (discussing the defections of
Cuban baseball players and their hopes of playing in MLB); see also Horn, supra
note 101, at 7 (describing the defections of various Cuban players).
179. See supra notes 120-121 (explaining the bilateral agreements regarding
Cuban boat defectors). See generally Where Are We Heading?, supra note 9, at 2
(statement of Michael Ranneberger) (asserting that the United States cooperates
with the Castro regime on law enforcement and migration matters when it benefits
United States' interests). The migration of boat defectors during 1996 became part
of a momentous event in United States-Cuba relations. See Alejandre v. Cuba, 996
F. Supp. 1239, 1242 (S.D. Fla. 1997). The Cuban Air Force shot down an unarmed
anti-Castro exile group plane, killing four people performing a humanitarian mis-
sion to assist boat defectors floating between the Florida Keys and Cuba. See id. at
1242-43; see also Dhooge, supra note 4, at 576 (explaining that the outrage over
this event led to the enactment of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(Libertad) Act within two weeks of the downing of the planes).
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omy,"8 ° and subsequently encouraged further baseball defections."'
180. See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act sees. 102,
201, 301, 22 U.S.C. sees. 6032, 6061, 6301 (1996) (enacting a policy to strengthen
international sanctions against the Castro government, promote a democratic Cuba,
protect the property rights of United States nationals, and exclude certain aliens
involved in the confiscation or trafficking of property owned by a United States
national). Title I codifies the existing embargo on Cuba, in effect until a demo-
cratic transition occurs in Cuba. See id. Title II authorizes assistance for a demo-
cratic transition by providing food and medical supplies for the Cuban people. See
id. Title III enables a United States national to sue persons that knowingly benefit
from use of confiscated American property. See id. Title IV denies visas to aliens
who confiscate or traffic in such property confiscated from Americans. See id.;
Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. sec. 6001 et. seq. (using sanctions
against Cuban government and contacts with the Cuban people to spur democratic
transition and economic growth in Cuba); see also MICHAEL RANNEBERGER,
TULANE SPEECH ON CUBAN TRANSITION PROCESS (Nov. 9, 1998) (reprinted in
USIA: THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 3 (visited Mar. 27, 1999)
<http://www.usia.gov/regional/ar/us-cuba/ran9.htm> (explaining that the United
States emphasis on supporting the Cuban people stems from the passage of the
Cuban Democracy Act). Accordingly, the United States seeks to increase the in-
formation exchanged with the Cuban people, promote people-to-people contacts,
and encourage independent groups to advance such interactions. See id. The Cuban
Democracy Act established sanctions against nations that assist Cuba, increased
restrictions on humanitarian aid, restricted remittances to Cubans, and refused en-
try to any vessel that visited Cuba in the last 180 days. See US.-Cuba Commis-
sion: U.S.-Cuba History, supra note 176; see also Cuban Democracy Act sec. 3(7).
The United States will maintain sanctions on the Castro government until it moves
towards greater democratization and respects human rights. See id. Carefully
weighed reductions in sanctions will take place once the Castro government makes
positive changes. See id.; A Report On the Immediate Impact of The Cuban Liberty
& Democratic Solidarity Act (Libertad) (last modified July 12, 1996)
<http://canfnet.org/english/press/e960712a.htm> [hereinafter Report on Libertad]
(discussing the retarding effect of United States legislation on foreign investment
in Cuba). Many international companies either ended operations or are reassessing
their operations in Cuba since the enactment of the Helms-Burton Act). See gener-
ally supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of the Helms-
Burton Act within the overall history of the United States embargo against Cuba).
The Helms-Burton Act strengthens the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 by increas-
ing international pressure on the Castro government to create democratic change
and improve its human rights record. See STUART EIZENSTAT, Under Secretary of
State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs, HELMS-BURTON TITLE III
WAIVER (July 16, 1998), reprinted in USIA: THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA (vis-
ited Mar. 27, 1999) <http://www.usia.gov/re gional/ar/us-cuba/eizenl6.htm> (dis-
cussing President Clinton's decision to suspend Title III of the Helms-Burton Act
in an effort to hasten a democratic transition in Cuba); see generally also Fact
Sheet: Suspension of Title III 'Libertad' Provisions, USIS WASHINGTON FILE (last
modified Jan. 19, 1999) <http://www.usia.gov/regional/ ar/us-cuba/fact199.htm>
(explaining that the President suspended Title III of the Helms-Burton Act to fur-
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Unlike Jackie Robinson's' pioneering entry into MLB, that eventu-
ally enabled societal changes regarding race relations,' the legisla-
tive developments following Arocha's arrival additionally aggra-
vated the relations between the United States and Cuba.""' Ultimately,
by encouraging further defections, this legislation extended animos-
ity to the baseball diamond.''
C. UNITED STATES-CUBA RELATIONS AND THE "EL DUQUE" MODEL
Whether through direct or indirect methods, during the past forty
years the United States repeatedly attempted to depose Fidel Cas-
tro.'85 By defiantly retaining power, the Castro government infuriates
the powerful Cuban-American lobby"6 and the United States gov-
ernment because of its communist ideology, rampant human rights
ther develop a coherent multilateral effort to promote democracy and human rights
within Cuba).
181. See supra notes 82, 96-123 and accompanying text (explaining the defec-
tions of other Cuban baseball players, and how better economic opportunities in
MLB encouraged the defections).
182. See Devine, supra note 150, at 489 (stating that after Jackie Robinson's
entry into MLB, both the President and Congress implemented changes designed
to improve race relations in the United States).
183. See Report on Libertad, supra note 180 (noting that the Castro regime ab-
hors the Helms-Burton Act). Castro seeks to rally global opposition to the law be-
cause it harms Cuba's economy by depriving it of international investment); see
also U.S.-Cuba Commission: U.S.-Cuba Histor,, supra note 176 (explaining Cas-
tro's successful efforts to create international opposition to the Helms-Burton Act
and the United States embargo). For the seventh consecutive year, the United Na-
tions General Assembly drafted a resolution calling for an end to the embargo. See
id.
184. See Borden, supra note 76, at 3B (emphasizing that the success and notori-
ety achieved by Cuban baseball defectors infuriates Castro).
185. See Kiger, supra note 3 passin (discussing the various attempts of the
United States to depose Castro, including military invasion, assassination, and the
evolving economic embargo); see also Pascal Fletcher, Cuba Claims Record Num-
ber of Anti-Castro Plots, REUTERS NEWS SERVICES, July 19, 1999 (disclosing
Cuba's assertions that the United States attempted to assassinate Fidel Castro 637
times in the last 40 years). See generally Where Are We Heading?, supra note 9, at
2-4 (Statement of Jorge Mas) (calling for the United States to strengthen efforts to
depose Castro).
186. See Where Are We Heading?, supra note 9, at 2-4 (Statement of Jorge Mas)
(discussing CANF's role in formulating the United States policy towards Cuba).
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abuses, 187 and the visceral issue of confiscated American property.'
After Arocha's defection, the hostile relations between the United
States and Cuba further extended this bilateral animosity to the world
of baseball by producing the "El Duque" model.
The poor economic conditions within Cuba, exacerbated by the
lack of Soviet assistance'89 and the strengthened United States em-
bargo,'9° increased the allure of MLB's skyrocketing salary struc-
ture' 9' for Cuban baseball players.' 9 To immediately obtain these ap-
187. See Cuba Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, United
States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (last
modified Feb. 26, 1999) <http://ww w.usia.gov/regional/ar/us-cuba/hr98.htm> (in-
dicating Cuba's dismal human rights record that includes systematic violations of
Cubans' civil and political rights); see also Where Are We Heading?, supra note 9,
at 2-3 (statement of Michael Ranneberger) (discussing United States' efforts to
compel Cuba to improve upon human rights conditions through economic sanc-
tions and people-to-people contacts). But see Nidia Diaz, Helms-Burton Act's
Third Anniversary: Economic and Political Warfare is Continuing and Becoming
More Brazen (visited Mar. 3, 1999) <http://www.granma.cu/granma/ingles
/marzo3/alarcon-i.html> (contending that Cuba's recent legislation is an effort to
protect Cuba's sovereignty and independence from the hostile United States). Cuba
also castigates the United States for its own human rights abuses. See id. See gen-
erally U.N.H.R.C., 55th Sess., 50th mtg., U.N. Doc. HR/CN/99/54 (1999) (ex-
pressing the Commission on Human Rights' displeasure with the adoption of the
Law for the Protection of National Independence and Economy of Cuba and other
repressive measures regarding Cuba's human rights situation).
188. See Where Are We Heading?, supra note 9, at 5 (statement of Michael
Ranneberger) (discussing the animosity generated by the Cuban government's con-
fiscation and use of American property). See generally supra note 4 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the enactment of the Helms-Burton Act and the provisions
that penalize persons dealing with confiscated American property within Cuba).
189. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (noting how the cessation of
Soviet assistance to Cuba exacerbated the economic conditions of Cuban baseball).
190. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing the Cuban Democ-
racy Act of 1992, as well as the Helms-Burton Act, which strengthened the United
States embargo against Cuba).
191. See Lockwood, supra note 140, at D5 (indicating the disparity between
wealthy and less profitable teams); see also Yankees Payroll Tops $85 M, supra
note 177 (discussing the rise in MLB salaries).
192. See Bjarkman, Cuba: Four Decades, supra note 15, at 31 (discussing the
appeal of large salaries to Cuban baseball players). See generally supra notes 110-
133 and accompanying text (describing how the "El Duque" model makes large
salaries available).
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pealing salaries or play in front of a Cuban-American crowd, 93 how-
ever, players must follow the "El Duque" model and defect to a third
country.' 94 The internal Cuban and MLB policies, which stem from
poor bilateral relations, leave defecting Cuban players without any
feasible alternatives to this mode of Cuban baseball player immigra-
tion.'95 Consequently, the "El Duque" model continues to taint the
common ground between the United States and Cuba because of its
circuitous path around the laws that compelled its creation.'9
Instead of continuing to allow this method of immigration to make
baseball yet another area that fuels the burning animosity between
the United States and Cuba, implementing significant changes re-
garding the "El Duque" model can allow baseball to bring the two
nations closer together.'97 Recent developments indicate a willingness
to utilize baseball in this direction.'9"
193. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (maintaining that Cuban base-
ball defectors frequently choose to play for MLB teams with a Cuban-American
fan base).
194. See supra notes 108-133 and accompanying text (detailing Joe Cubas' ef-
forts to assist Cuban baseball defectors, and how the "El Duque" model allows
them to sign large free-agent contracts by sending them to establish residency in a
third country).
195. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing Castro's ban of pro-
fessional sports); see Kuhn Directive, supra note 69, at 1 (prohibiting the signing
of players within Cuba).
196. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing both the Cuban
Democracy Act of 1992 and the Helms-Burton Act, which further compounded the
economic problems of Cuban baseball and encouraged defections); see also supra
notes 82-86 and accompanying text (relating Cuban defections); supra notes 124-
126 and accompanying text (discussing the manner in which the "El Duque" model
circumvents Castro's 1960 ban, the Kuhn Directive, the CAA, and how such base-
ball defections harm United States-Cuba relations).
197. See Boswell, supra note 85, at DI (emphasizing the importance of baseball
within Cuba); infra notes 214-266 and accompanying text (discussing the impor-
tance of baseball within both nations, and the proposals of an effective Baseball
Diplomacy that can ameliorate bilateral relations).
198. See Lippman, supra note 5, at AI (discussing the use of the Orioles-Cuban
National Team series as a way to increase contacts between the Cuban and Ameri-
can people).
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D. A NEW HOPE: UNITED STATES-CUBA RELATIONS
THE ORIOLE WAY
In addition to other efforts that increased contacts with the Cuban
people," the exhibition games between the Orioles and the Cuban
National team illustrated baseball's power to bring the Cuban and
American people closer together.2 °° Although both nations asserted
that the games only represented people-to-people contacts, and not
an attempt to normalize relations,' the potential exists for baseball
to forge closer ties between the two nations without abandoning their
principles.02 For such an effective Baseball Diplomacy to occur,
199. See Andrew Cawthome, U.S. Boats Pour Into Havana After Race from
Tampa, REUTERS NEWS SERVICES, June 1, 1999 (reporting on the record number
of American boats in the Tampa Bay to Havana Cup regatta). The regatta served as
part of the continuing effort to increase contacts between the Cuban and American
people. See id.; Philadelphia Boys Choir to Perform in Cuba, PHILADELPHIA BOYS
CHOIR AND CHORALE PRESS RELEASE, Mar. 22, 1999 (reporting that the non-profit
Philadelphia Boys Choir will perform in Havana to achieve diplomacy through
music); see also U.S. Pop Stars Arrive in Cuba, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 22,
1999, available in WL, APNEWS (discussing the Music Bridge Around the World
Festival, which allowed Cuban and American musicians to collaborate in an effort
to bring the two cultures closer together); see generally Andrew Cawthorne,
Cuba's Catholic Church Enjoys Easter Freedom, REUTERS NEWS SERVICES, Apr.
4, 1999 (recognizing greater freedoms and open celebrations enjoyed by Cuban
Roman Catholics after Pope John Paul II's 1998 visit).
200. See Kohm, Jr., supra note 2, at 1231-33 (commenting on the importance of
baseball to American society); see also Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 15, at 12
(discussing the even greater emphasis placed on baseball in Cuban society);
Lippman, supra note 5, at Al (discussing the Clinton Administration's proposals
for greater people-to-people contacts through the Orioles-Cuban National Team
series). But see Michael E. Ruane & Scott Wilson, Cuban Pitching Coach Defects
in Baltimore: Ex-Player Sought Help After Orioles Game, WASH. POST, May 5,
1999, at Al (detailing the defection of Cuban pitching coach, and former National
Team player, Rigoberto Betancourt Herrera, which slightly marred the exhibition
series between the Orioles and Cubans).
201. See Serge F. Kovaleski, For U.S. and Cuba, It Was Just a Game: Baseball
Fosters Goodwill, No Policy Gains, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1999, at A8 (stressing
that United States and Cuban officials agree that the exhibition baseball games are
merely people-to-people contacts and do not represent an effort to normalize dip-
lomatic relations). State Department spokesman James P. Rubin suggested that
baseball games with MLB and little league teams provided an opportunity for the
Cuban people to view the diversity of America. See id.
202. See Pascal Fletcher, Cuba Says Sport, Music Show Normal U.S. Ties Possi-
ble, REUTERS NEWS SERVICES, Mar. 29, 1999 (explaining the statements of Cuban
National Assembly President Ricardo Alarcon, who stated that the potential exists
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however, MLB, the United States, and Cuba must eliminate the
problematic "El Duque" model that exacerbates existing problems
within MLB °3 and United States-Cuba relations. "
IV. EFFECTIVE BASEBALL DIPLOMACY: A
DOUBLE PLAY FOR MLB AND UNITED STATES-
CUBA RELATIONS
The drain of talent from Cuba to MLB provides a source of inter-
national embarrassment to Cuban President, and baseball fan, Fidel
Castro . 5 Castro's distaste for these defections embitters United
for a peaceful relationship between the United States and Cuba as long as it re-
mains respectful); see also Where Are We Heading?, supra note 9, at 8 (statement
of Michael Ranneberger) (setting forth the United States' policy that seeks to sup-
port the Cuban people while pressuring the Cuban government to change); see id.
at 11 (statement of Otto J. Reich, President, U.S.-Cuba Business Council) (calling
for creative actions to directly communicate with the Cuban people in an effort to
expose the abuses of the Cuban government). See generally Siena Plans Cuba
Baseball Trip ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 12, 1999, available in WL, APNEWS (ex-
plaining that Siena College recently sought the approval of the Treasury Depart-
ment to play Cuban collegiate teams in Cuba to continue efforts at Baseball Di-
plomacy).
203. See supra notes 135-148 and accompanying text (explaining that under the
"El Duque" model, defecting Cuban baseball players choose either to sign with
teams with nearby Cuban populations, or with teams that can afford to sign them to
large free agent contracts). This model exacerbates the ability of poorer MLB
teams to compete because it furthers their financial disadvantage. See id.
204. See Fletcher, supra note 202 (explaining Alarcon's position on the possi-
bility of more Cuban baseball players playing in MLB). According to Alarcon,
Cuban players could potentially play in MLB if the United States or MLB did not
pressure the players to defect. See id. But see Telephone Interview with Milton
Jamail, Ph.D., University of Texas (Apr. 13, 1999) (asserting that despite Alar-
con's statements, the Cuban government would be unable to deal with wealthy
Cuban MLB players returning to live in Cuba).
205. See SAMUEL 0. REGALDO, VIvA BASEBALL! 14 (1998) (describing Castro's
interest in the 1958 World Series during his efforts to foment revolution); see also
Lee Michael Katz & Daniela Deane, Orioles May Step Up To Bat In Cuba - 'A Lot
Of Talent' Found On Island, Sportswriter Says, USA TODAY, Jan. 5, 1999, at 13A
(describing Fidel Castro as an animated baseball fan and a former pitching pros-
pect); see also Borden, supra note 76, at 3B (explaining that the "El Duque"
model, and the efforts of Cubas personally hurt Castro); Andrew Cawthorne, Cuba
Baseball Stragglers Come Home, Pledge LoYalty, REUTERS NEWS SERVICES, May
7, 1999 (quoting Cuban Sports Minister Humberto Rodriguez Gonzalez, who de-
scribed baseball as "Fidel's sport"). But see Bjarkman, supra note 73, at 65-68
(dismissing the stories regarding Castro's pitching ability as mere myth, and em-
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States-Cuba relations, and is strikingly similar to many MLB teams'
distaste for the departure of free agent players to rival teams.' 6 While
the original defectors did not represent Cuba's best talent, °7 the sub-
sequent defections of pitchers Osvaldo Fernandez and the Hernandez
brothers illustrated that the top-tier players also desired to leave Cuba
for MLB. 208 To prevent further defections, the touring National Team
suspended several players suspected of defecting, and shuffled its
roster to exclude some of the best players.2 ° Many baseball scouts
phasizing that MLB teams never considered him a prospect).
206. See David Schoenfield, Success, But At What Price? (last modified Feb. 3,
1999) <http://espn.go.com/mlb/features/01079734 .html> (describing the inability
of some teams to pay for their free agent players). Less profitable teams are resent-
ful towards wealthier teams that sign their former players. See id. A compensation
system, however, exists for teams that lose players to other teams via free agency.
See Sean McAdam, Looking For Answers, (last modified Feb. 5, 1999)
<http://espn.go.com/mlb/state/solutions.html> (discussing the MLB compensation
system for teams that lose players to free agency). At the June Draft, MLB pro-
vides the compensatory "sandwich picks," which come in between the first and
second round for teams that lose players as free agents. See id.; see also Kohm, Jr.,
supra note 2, at 1245 (setting forth the National Football League's compensation
system for teams that lose players to free agency). The system provides that when
a player's contract expires with one team, and that player signs with another, the
new team must provide the player's former team with compensation either in the
form of a draft pick, money, or additional players. See id.
207. See David Germain, Cuban Baseball Players Defecting But None Are
Among the Best Prospects, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 14, 1993, at 6D, available
in 1993 WL 5272988 (noting that many Cubans considered defecting players, such
as Ordonez and others who did not start for the Cuban National Team, as second
rate baseball players); Steve Wulf, Cuba's Arms Shipment: Two of the Island Na-
tion 's Premier Pitchers Took a Walk and Are Now Striking Out on Their Own in
Major League Baseball, TIME, Mar. 11, 1996, at 77 (describing the efforts to dis-
miss the early defectors as disgruntled second-rate players).
208. See id., at 77 (maintaining that the successful performances of defecting
Cuban players made such dismissals difficult). See generally Bjarkman, Lifting the
hon Curtain of Cuban Baseball, supra note 15, at 33 (explaining that the Cuban
National Team's dominance of Olympic, World Cup, and Pan American Games
competitions illustrated the depth of Cuban talent). These Cuban National Teams
won both Olympic gold medals, fifteen of the eighteen world amateur titles since
1969, and every Pan American Games gold medal since 1963. See id., at 33-34.
But see Livan's Brother: Ace or Wild Card? (last modified Dec. 31, 1997)
<http://www.sportingnews .com/baseball/articles/19980114/38950.html> (claim-
ing that defecting Cuban players, such as Rene Arocha, Osvaldo Fernandez, and
Ariel Prieto enjoyed limited success in MLB).
209. See Michael E. Ruane & Scott Wilson, Cubans Meet The Orioles In His-
toric Matchup: Game Seen as Tool To Ease Hostility, WASH. POST, May 4, 1999,
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claim that this drastic rearrangement represents the beginning of
Castro's effort to prevent further baseball defections to America."'
Rather than witness these players defect to the United States, several
scouts believe that Castro will sell the rights' to the players cleared
for the 2000 Olympics to the Japanese League. '1"
Preventing talented Cuban baseball players from competing on the
National Team, or sending them to Japan, only balks at the possibil-
ity to improve the relations between the United States and Cuba
through Baseball Diplomacy.23 The recent changes in the embargo
against Cuba indicate the United States' willingness to seek greater
contacts between the people of these two nations.1 Moreover, Fidel
Castro's recent international agreements recognize the importance of
at A4 (reporting that Cuba left talented shortstop German Mesa off their roster for
the May 3rd game in Baltimore because of suspicions that he planned to defect);
see also Maloney, supra note 121, at D2 (remarking that the Cuban National Team
suspended pitcher Ariel Prieto because of his desire to defect); Larry Rohter, No
Joy in Cuba, as Its Baseball Team Strikes Out, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1997, at A41
(observing that Cuban baseball fans are confounded because some of their best
players are not on the National Team roster). See generally Gonzalez Echevarria,
supra note 13, at 386 (explaining that suspensions provide roster spots for younger
players because the Cuban economy precludes expanding the number of teams).
210. See Peter Gammons, Much Trade Talk to Contend With, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 14, 1996, Sports 56, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File (ex-
plaining the possibility that rights to Cuban players may be sold to teams in Japan
after the 2000 Olympics).
211. See Bjarkman, Cuba: Four Decades, supra note 15, at 31 (speculating that
Castro will sell the rights of Cuban players to other baseball leagues around the
world because the Cuban League is struggling financially). See generally supra
note 59 and accompanying text (outlining the MLB policy on retaining the rights
of a player).
212. See Gammons, supra note 210, at Sports 56 (discussing Castro's potential
strategy with his baseball players for the 2000 Olympics); see also Bjarkman,
Cuba: Four Decades, supra note 15, at 31 (relaying the rumored plans about sell-
ing the rights of Cuba's best players to Japan).
213. See Brown, supra note 81, at 109 (explaining the politicization of Cuban
baseball and Castro's efforts to use baseball as a diplomatic tool). The travelling
Cuban National Team played against Nicaragua to benefit flood victims, and
played against Japan to fortify the two nations' trading policies. See id.
214. See Statement on United States Policy Toward Cuba, supra note 5, at 7-8
(noting United States efforts to increase contacts between the Cuban and American
people as a means of fostering better relations).
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forging political and economic ties to ease Cuba's economic crisis."5
Consequently, changes regarding Cuban baseball immigration can
provide the impetus for creating the greater contacts and economic
ties desired by both nations. Thus, the incentive exists for Castro to
permit Cubans to compete in MLB if such a policy could both rectify
the deteriorating conditions of Cuban baseball, 17 and enable the peo-
215. See Serge F. Kovaleski, Cuba Rolls Out Welcome Mat To Counter Em-
bargo's Effects, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1999, at A21 (explaining Cuba's efforts to
form closer ties with other nations to ease the crippling effects of the United States
embargo and the disappearance of Soviet subsidies); see also Andrew Cawthorne,
Cuba Keen But Selective On Foreign Investment, REUTERS NEWS SERVICES, May
14, 1999 (interviewing Cuban Foreign Investment Minister Ibrahim Ferradaz, who
stated that Cuba attracted over $2 billion in foreign investment during the 1990s to
offset the economic crisis brought about by the termination of Soviet assistance);
British Minister Welcomes BA London-Havana Flight, REUTERS NEWS SERVICES,
Apr. 10, 1999 (discussing British Airways' new London to Havana direct flight
program, which is part of an effort to increase British investment and trade rela-
tions with Cuba); Portuguese Group Signs New Cuba Investment Deals, REUTERS
NEWS SERVICES, Apr. 10, 1999 (explaining the new bilateral trade, investment, and
tourism agreements between Cuba and Portugal). But see Cuban Comm. For Hu-
man Rights v. Bank of America, No. 9915148CAO1, (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed June 24,
1999) (seeking to prevent further international investment within Cuba). This class
action suit accuses 40 multinational companies of conspiring with the Cuban gov-
ernment to discriminate against Cuban nationals by denying them access to prem-
ises used by tourists. See Ana Acle, Exile Lawsuit: Foreign Firms Discriminate
Against Cubans, June 25, 1999, MIAMI HERALD, at lB, available in LEXIS, News
Library (describing that the Cuban exile groups seek to receive $1.35 billion in
compensatory damages, and desire to address the civil rights abuses within Cuba).
216. See Pascal Fletcher, Cuba May Consider U.S. Moves If Not 'Subversive,'
REUTERS NEWS SERVICES, Feb. 18, 1999 (indicating Cuba's receptiveness to
modifications of the United States embargo that increase bilateral exchanges as
long as they do not occur in a way that subverts the rule of the Cuban government);
see also Statement on United States Policy Toward Cuba, supra note 5, at 7-8 (de-
scribing that the United States implemented changes to the embargo to foster bilat-
eral communication); cf Robert Jablon, U.S. Musicians to Work With Cubans,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 15, 1999, available in WL, APNEWS (indicating the
willingness to forge closer cultural ties between the United States and Cuba
through the "Music Bridges Over Troubled Waters" program). Similar efforts in
the former Soviet Union, Indonesia, Romania, and Ireland produced music despite
the respective political differences. See id. But see Pascal Fletcher, Cuba Defends
Anti-Crime, Anti-Subversion Laws, REUTERS NEWS SERVICES, Feb. 17, 1999
(characterizing the new Cuban legislation designed to check internal dissent, in
light of the United States' recent changes in the embargo).
217. See supra notes 175-178, 205-208 and accompanying text (explaining that
the deteriorating economic conditions of Cuban baseball are compounded by the
defections and suspensions of potential defectors).
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pie-to-people contacts needed to energize the relationship between
the United States and Cuba."8
Recent statements from Cuban officials indicate a willingness by
Cuba to allow its players to compete in MLB, provided that any new
arrangement respects Cuban socialist sports. 19 Continued adherence
to the "El Duque" model will only serve to intensify the many prob-
lems that stem from this model. "-0 Adhering to a four-step process,
however, can alleviate these problems, and create an effective Base-
ball Diplomacy to improve the quality of MLB and United States-
Cuba relations.
218. See Statement on United States Policy Toward Cuba, supra note 5, at 7-8
(remarking on United States' efforts to increase people to people contacts); see
also Kovaleski, supra note 215, at A21 (stating that Cuba seeks greater economic
ties to rectify its faltering economy).
219. See Luis Varela, Cuba May Make Deal With Baseball, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Oct. 30, 1998, available in WL, APNEWS (quoting Cuban Sports Minister Rodri-
guez Gonzalez' statement regarding Cuba's openness towards allowing Cuban
players to join MLB); see also Fletcher, supra note 202 (indicating Alarcon's
willingness to allow Cuban players to compete in MLB). But see Miguel Heman-
dez, Provocative Maneuvers Denounced (visited Aug. 6, 1999)
<http://www.granma.culingles/agostofemandezi.html> (relating the Cuban Olym-
pic Committee's outrage over the Canadian and American media's coverage of
Cuban defections during the recent Pan American Games). Despite winning their
eighth straight gold medal in baseball, Cuban relief pitcher Danys Baez defected,
which brought the total number of Cuban defectors at the 1999 Pan American
games to eight. See Brian Trusdell, Defections Is Focus at Pan Am Games,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 3, 1999, available in WL, APNEWS (explaining that the
attention afforded to these defections humiliated the Cuban delegation, and soured
the international baseball climate).
220. See Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 15, at 12 (emphasizing that, although
defecting Cuban baseball players may enjoy high salaries in MLB, they must both
renounce their nation and abandon their families to receive such pay); see also su-
pra notes 140-148 and accompanying text (explaining that Cuban talent increas-
ingly becomes confined to wealthy teams, or to those cities with Cuban popula-
tions, which ultimately damages MLB's competitive balance); Rohter, supra note
209, at A41 (detailing that the suspensions of many talented players who are sus-
pected of defecting aggravates the deteriorating conditions of Cuban baseball). See
generally Pressley, supra note 126, at Al (commenting on the use of the "El
Duque" model for defection, and how recent defectors intended to embarrass Cas-
tro). See also Farrey, supra note 125 (providing the account of recent defector
Maikel Jova, who asserts that Cuban players and fans no longer want their baseball
ruined by suspensions and loans of players to other countries against their will).
Jova condemns Castro and states that players no longer want to play for the Cuban
President. See id.
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A. FIRST BASE: ENDING EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES
To facilitate changes in Cuban baseball player immigration, MLB,
Cuba, and the United States must first abandon their policies of ex-
clusion. For this to occur, MLB must abandon former Commissioner
Kuhn's 1977 Directive, which prevents MLB teams from scouting or
signing Cuban players. 2 ' Such a change will bring MLB closer to
Kuhn's ultimate goal of utilizing baseball to improve bilateral rela-
tions between Cuba and the United States. 2 1 In addition, Castro must
remove the 1960 ban on Cubans competing in professional sports,
which discourages Cuban participation in MLB. 23
For the United States, however, changes in Cuban baseball immi-
gration require neither abandoning the economic embargo against
221. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text (discussing the 1977 Kuhn
Directive); Telephone Interview with William A. Murray, supra note 70 (asserting
that the revisions to the 1977 Kuhn Directive compelled MLB scouts to comply
with the United States embargo against Cuba). Murray indicated that changes to
MLB's exclusionary policy would only correlate with changes in United States'
laws or policy towards Cuba. See id. Accordingly, the 1991 revisions to the Kuhn
Directive recommended establishing "an orderly procedure" for signing and
scouting Cuban players if such changes in United States laws or policy occur. See
Memorandum from William A. Murray, supra note 70 (suggesting that the Com-
missioner will inform MLB teams of changes in MLB's Cuba policy if appropriate
changes within United States laws or policies occur); see also H.R. 262, 106th
Cong. sec. 2(a) (1999) (proposing a modified application of each of sec. 620(a) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, sec. 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act,
and sec. 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, to allow Cu-
ban baseball players to compete in MLB). Additionally, sec. 2(b) and (c) call for
policy changes regarding the application of sec. 212(f) of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act and sec. 102(h) of the Helms-Burton Act to provide entry of Cuban
baseball players to MLB. See generally infra note 225 and accompanying text
(detailing how these provisions modify the United States embargo to permit the
enactment of the Baseball Diplomacy Act).
222. See supra notes 167-173 and accompanying text (describing Kuhn's efforts
to organize Baseball Diplomacy in the 1970s).
223. See Gonzalez Echevarria, supra note 13, at 363 (describing the effects of
Castro's ban on professional sports). While Castro imposed the ban to prevent the
exploitation of athletes, Cuba's baseball elite continues to receive extremely favor-
able treatment. See id. at 361-64.; see also Bjarkman, Cuba: Four Decades, supra
note 209, at 14 (discussing the current state of the Cuban League). In contrast to
baseball players, the Cuban government already permits volleyball and soccer stars
to join professional leagues around the world. See id. See generally Garcia, supra
note 83 (noting that Cuba and Japan agreed to permit pitcher Victor Mesa to com-
pete as a professional in the Japanese league).
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Cuba, nor the overall policy that seeks people-to-people contacts to
hasten a democratic transition.-" Such changes merely require pre-
cise modifications of portions of the embargo to permit an effective
Baseball Diplomacy to begin.- These changes will indicate a will-
224. See Statement on United States Policy Toward Cuba, supra note 5, at 7
(stating the United States policy to encourage people-to-people contacts between
Cubans and Americans).
225. See H.R. 262, sec. 2 (calling for modifications to the United States embargo
to permit Cuban baseball players to compete in MLB). The Baseball Diplomacy
Act seeks to utilize sec. 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which pro-
hibits furnishing assistance to the Cuban government. See Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 sec. 620(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 87-195, 22 U.S.C. sec. 2370 (1997). To effect
this policy, the President may institute a complete embargo on all trade between
the United States and Cuba. See id. The President may waive the prohibition on
assistance for national security or humanitarian reasons. See id. at 620A(d); State-
ment on United States Policy Toward Cuba, supra note 5, at 7 (explaining that
President Clinton's decision to increase people-to-people contacts drew from his
decision to waive sec. 620(a) for the humanitarian reasons of bringing the Cuban
and American people closer together). Section 2 of the Baseball Diplomacy Act
also seeks to modify the application of the embargo against Cuba with respect to
sec. 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act. See H.R. 262, sec. 2(a) (seeking to
modify the application of sec. 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act so that it
will not interfere with permitting the immigration of Cuban baseball players);
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 sec. 5(b), Pub. L. No. 65-91, amended b' 50
U.S.C sec. 1601, Pub. L. No. 95-223 (1977) (empowering the President to prohibit,
regulate, or investigate residents of either the United States or Cuba who conduct
transactions within Cuba). Enabling Cuban baseball players to sign contracts with
MLB teams will insure that MLB makes these players comply with sec. 5(b),
which calls for compulsory testimony and document production by residents of
either nation in regards to such transactions. See id. See generally infra notes 227-
234 and accompanying text (calling for the application of an orderly system that
exposes Cuban players to the June Draft, and permits these players to sign con-
tracts with MLB teams). The Baseball Diplomacy Act also calls for modifications
in the application of sec. 203 of the International Emergency Powers Act. See H.R.
262 infra note 252, sec. 2(a) (seeking to forestall the application of sec. 203 of the
International Emergency Powers Act from preventing the enactment of the Base-
ball Diplomacy Act); International Emergency Economic Powers Act sec. 203,
Pub. L. 95-223, 50 U.S.C. sec. 1701 (granting the President the authority to require
persons conducting transactions with Cuba to maintain and produce documentation
detailing their transactions). Furthermore, the President may regulate the donations
of articles and materials intended to relieve human suffering if such donations im-
pair or undermine the President's ability to maintain the embargo against Cuba).
This section applies to the Cuban baseball players who will return to Cuba with
money from MLB, and their possible efforts to contribute to the welfare of Cuban
society. See generally Telephone Interview With Milton Jamail, supra note 194
(explaining the potential inability of the Cuban government to cope with rich and
famous Cuban baseball players who return to their homeland and seek to assist
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ingness to allow Cuban baseball players to join MLB, and allow
Baseball Diplomacy to reach First Base.
B. SECOND BASE: DRAFTING CUBAN PLAYERS
To remain close to the Cuban government's desire to respect the
principles of Cuban sports226 and to bolster the competitive balance
their countrymen). Additionally, the Baseball Diplomacy Act seeks to modify the
application of sec. 515.564 of Title 31, of the Code of Federal Regulations to per-
mit Cuban baseball players to return to Cuba with their earnings from MLB. See
H.R. 262 infra note 252, sec. 2(a)(1) (seeking to preclude the application of Cuban
Assets Control Regulations from preventing the enactment of the Baseball Diplo-
macy Act); Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. sec. 515.564 (1994)
(prohibiting the authorization of any property or financial assistance to blocked ac-
counts within Cuba, and generally detailing the requirements that permit basic
travel and remittances to Cuba); see generally Statement on United States Policy
Toward Cuba, supra note 5 (increasing the amount of remittances by U.S. resi-
dents to specific Cuban nationals from $500 to $1,200 a year). Modifying the ap-
plication of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations to permit Cuban players to re-
turn to Cuba with their earnings would appease Alarcon, who claims that these
regulations prevent Cuban players from joining MLB. See Garcia, supra note 83
(remarking that with the current application of the Cuban Assets Control Regula-
tions, Cuban MLB baseball players who conducted transactions in Cuba would en-
counter stiff fines and jail sentences upon their return to the United States). But see
Telephone Interview With Milton Jamail, supra note 194 (arguing that by blaming
the statute, Alarcon seeks to avoid discussing Cuba's fears of celebrated rich base-
ball players, further exposing the dichotomy between the freedom of opportunity in
America and the Castro regime's faltering economy). Additionally, sec. 2(b) of the
Baseball Diplomacy Act anticipates the authority granted in sec. 212(f) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act that can prevent Cuban baseball players from re-
ceiving the visas necessary to compete within MLB. See H.R. 262 infra note 252,
see. 2(a)(1) (seeking to impede the application of sec. 212(f) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act from preventing the enactment of the Baseball Diplomacy
Act); Immigration and Nationality Act sec. 212(f) (as amended by 8 U.S.C. sec.
1182(f), 1 185(a)(1)) (authorizing the President to suspend the entry of any class of
aliens as he may deem appropriate). Finally, the Baseball Diplomacy Act seeks to
prevent the codified economic embargo against Cuba from inhibiting Cuban base-
ball players from improving bilateral relations. See H.R. 262 infra note 252, sec.
2(c) (explaining that the Baseball Diplomacy Act applies notwithstanding sec.
102(h) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of
1996); see Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996
sec. 102(h), 22 U.S.C. 6021 (strengthening the economic embargo against Cuba by
codifying it into law). See generally supra note 180 (detailing the provisions of the
LIBERTAD Act).
226. See supra note 219 and accompanying text (reporting that Cuban officials
would allow Cuban players to join MLB as long as the method used does not pro-
mote defection or violate principles of Cuban sports).
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within MLB, Baseball Diplomacy requires further proactive efforts.
Accordingly, MLB must implement a system that exposes Cuban
players who desire to play in MLB to the June Draft, instead of al-
lowing these players to follow the "El Duque" model." Drafting Cu-
ban players will comply with Kuhn's desire to establish an orderly
system that allows for the fair distribution of Cuban players. "2 Such
a change will spread the rich Cuban talent around the thinning MLB
rosters, and instill pride in the hearts of Cubans throughout the north-
em hemisphere. 9 Moreover, draffing Cuban players will allow
poorer MILB teams to acquire some of the best international talent
that they currently cannot obtain.2-0 Consequently, drafting Cuban
227. See supra notes 92-128 and accompanying text (explaining the various
models of Cuban entry into MLB, including the utilization of the June Draft to ab-
sorb players such as Alvarez and Fernandez in 1994). Changing MLB's Rules to
expose Cuban players in the June Draft will also eliminate the need to apply the
provisions of the CAA to Cuban players, since obtaining residency will no longer
pose a problem. See supra notes 74, 89-92 and accompanying text (explaining the
applicability of the CAA to Mocha's defection). Moreover, this may lead to a
more equitable application of the CAA to non-athlete defectors. See Moffett, supra
note 122 (explaining that Cuban baseball players receive favorable treatment over
the already politically favored group of Cuban immigrants who rely on the CAA).
228. See Kuhn Directive, supra note 69, at 1 (expressing Kuhn's desire to estab-
lish a fair system, which enables all MLB teams to gain access to Cuban players).
229. See Peter Bjarkman, Dandy Sand, and the Summer of "65, ELYSIAN
FIELDS Q., Winter 1998, at 49-51 (describing the career of Jewish three time Cy
Young Award winner, Sandy Koufax); Scott Bordow, In Cubs' Camp, Same Old
Sammy: NL MVP Remains Enthusiastic, Gracious After Busy Qffseason, WASH.
POST, Mar. 2, 1999, at D4 (describing the charitable and diplomatic efforts of Do-
minican 1998 National League MVP, Sammy Sosa); see also Martinez Bids Fare-
well, WASH. POST, Feb 7, 1999, at D2 (reviewing the career of Nicaraguan pitcher
Dennis Martinez, who holds the record for most wins by a Latin American
pitcher). Allowing such a draft can enable Cuban players to receive accolades from
their fellow countrymen, much the same way Sandy Koufax, Sammy Sosa, and
Dennis Martinez receive support from their respective religious, national, or ethnic
groups. See id. Moreover, such a Cuban draft provides a creative avenue to in-
crease people-to-people contacts between the Cuban and American people. See
Where Are We Heading?, supra note 9, at 8 (statement of Michael Ranneberger)
(discussing that the implementation of the United States' Cuba policy requires
creative ways to maintain pressure on the Cuban government for democratic
changes, while seeking to promote contacts between the people of the two nations).
230. See supra notes 136-148, 153 and accompanying text (explaining the diffi-
culty that poor MLB teams encounter when attempting to sign the best interna-
tional players); see also McAdam, supra note 206 (calling for a world-wide draft
to allow all MLB teams the same chance to obtain the world's best talent).
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players will provide the opportunity for these teams to enjoy in-
creased fan support, media interest, attendance levels, and television
and radio ratings that can buoy their financial solvency.23'
To do so, MLB must amend both Rule 4(a) and Rule 3(a)(1) to
permit the drafting of Cuban players, and allow these newly drafted
players to sign contracts with the teams that draft them. An amended
Rule 4(a) should read, "For purposes of this Rule 4, the term 'United
States' shall mean the 50 States of the United States of America, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and any other Commonwealth,
Territory or Possession of the United States of America. Addition-
ally, for the purposes of this Rule 4, a player may be eligible to sign
if said player resides within the Republic of Cuba.232 Moreover,
Rule 3(a)(1)'s provisions for the First-Year Draft should include this
amended language to enable the signing of Cuban players.233
Drafting Cuban baseball players, however, will not deprive these
players of the ability to command large contracts. In fact, the
amendments will allow Cuban players to be treated like all the other
MLB players who are entitled to salary arbitration after three years
of service within MLB, and who can obtain free agency after six
years with the same team.2 "4 The drafted Cuban baseball players will
McAdam's admirable draft proposal will allow players from Asia, Australia, and
Europe to enter MLB, but lies beyond the scope of the Baseball Diplomacy advo-
cated in this paper. See id.
231. See Martin J. Greenberg & James T. Gray, Citizenship Based Quota Sys-
tems In Athletics, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 337, 337-39 (1996) (recognizing the bene-
fits that foreign players can provide for sports leagues). See generally supra note
15 and accompanying text (discussing the popularity of Cuban baseball stars in
MLB history).
232. See Major League Baseball Rules, supra note 50, Rule 4(a) (determining
which baseball players are eligible for the June Draft [Additions are indicated in
italics]).
233. See Major League Baseball Rules, supra note 50, Rule 3(a)(1). The
amended language of this Rule should read: "For purposes of this Rule 3, the term
"United States" shall mean the 50 states of the United States of America, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and any other Commonwealth, Territory or Posses-
sion of the United States of America. Additionally, for the purposes of this Rule 4,
a player may be eligible to sign if said player resides within the Republic of
Cuba. "(Additions are indicated in italics).
234. See Kohm, Jr., supra note 2, at 1253 (arguing that changes in collective
bargaining rendered MLB's reserve clause, which previously indentured players to
one team for their careers, moot). Now, players can achieve free agency after six
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receive these conditions as well. Drafting Cuban players, therefore,
will allow Baseball Diplomacy to move halfivay towards its goals,
and advance to Second Base.
C. THIRD BASE: A CUBAN CONTRACT TAX To SUPPORT CUBAN
BASEBALL
To support the Cuban League that will provide MLB with Cuban
talent, MLB should impose a moderate tax on teams that sign Cuban
players. Much like the payroll and player salary taxes that go to
baseball's central revenue fund,ns MLB teams should pay a tax on
the contracts signed by Cuban players into a MLB fund designed to
support both the Cuban baseball infrastructure,2 and the Cuban
scouting efforts of all thirty MLB teams. -7 This tax will apply to
those Cuban players that continue to pursue the "El Duque" model,
as well as Cuban players that naturally become free agents after six
seasons with the same team. If a 2.5% tax2' exists the next time a
years of service and improve their contracts through salary arbitration. See id.
235. See Staudohar, Salary Caps in Professional Sports, supra note 142, at 8-9
(explaining MLB's luxury and player salary tax systems, which utilize funds from
both wealthy teams and player salaries to help poorer teams).
236. See Green, supra note 14 (reporting that proceeds from the Orioles-Cuban
National Team exhibition series will be used to support baseball and other sports in
the United States and Cuba). The enactment of a Cuban player salary tax pursuant
to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 would also assist Cuban baseball. See For-
eign Assistance Act of 1961 sec. 620A(d), 22 U.S.C. sec. 2370 (1997). The Presi-
dent may waive the prohibition on assistance to Cuba for humanitarian purposes,
such as forging greater people-to-people contacts sought by the Baseball Diplo-
macy Act. See id. A tax on Cuban baseball imposed in order to encourage such
contacts would comport with the humanitarian purposes of the waiver provision of
the Foreign Assistance Act. See id. Moreover, because the taxed funds would be
solely controlled by MLB and not used to assist the Cuban government, the hu-
manitarian waiver vill not denigrate the ultimate intent of the law to promote de-
mocratization. See id. Finally, such a tax that assists Cuban baseball will comply
with the Cuban government's desire to attract foreign investment. See Cawthome,
supra note 215 (explaining Foreign Investment Minister Ferradaz' desire to attract
foreign investment to counter Cuba's economic crisis).
237. See supra notes 64, 141 and accompanying text (detailing the inability of
several MLB teams to adequately conduct international scouting efforts, which
will be rectified by the establishment of a Cuban player contract tax to support in-
ternational scouting within Cuba).
238. See Staudohar, Salary Caps in Professional Team Sports, supra note 142,
at 9 (noting that under the 1996 collective bargaining agreement, a 2.5% tax on in-
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Cuban player like "El Duque" signs a $6.6 million contract, that
player's team will pay $150,000 into a MLB fund that supports Cu-
ban baseball and the scouting efforts of all MLB teams within
Cuba.219 Thus, while the United States will absorb talented Cuban
players, the success of these players will assist the development of
future Cuban stars by improving the infrastructure of Cuban baseball
through better equipment and training.240 This money will not go to
the Cuban government,2 4' but rather will remain under the auspices of
MLB while directly going to the Cuban people through baseball.4
dividual player salaries is contributed to MLB's central revenue fund to assist
small-market teams). Under this Third Base proposal, the 2.5% Cuban player sal-
ary tax will assist the Cuban baseball infrastructure.
239. See Gonzalez Echevarria, supra note 13, at 47-49 (explaining that in 1947,
the former Cuban League signed an agreement with the National Association of
Professional Baseball Leagues, the organization that oversaw minor league base-
ball in the United States, to ultimately supply MLB with Cuban talent). Despite
subsequent problems for the Cuban League, this agreement provides at least a pre-
revolutionary precedent for the Third Base proposal to establish a MLB presence
in Cuba.
240. See Brown, supra note 81, at 109 (identifying the Cuban government brand
Batos, which makes Cuban baseball equipment). Money from MLB can provide
Cuban baseball with the latest technologies and advances in equipment. See gener-
ally Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 15, at 12 (explaining that shortages caused
by the lack of Soviet sponsorship makes the rather respectable Cuban baseball
equipment industry suffer).
241. See Green, supra note 14 (stressing that receipts from the Orioles-Cuban
National Team exhibition series will fund Cuban baseball and other sports activi-
ties, not the Castro regime).
242. See Peter Bjarkman, Best and Worst of Times in Cuban League, INT'L
BASEBALL RUNDOWN, Oct. 1998, at 14 (emphasizing that Cuba's dire economic
conditions led to a drop in attendance for Cuban League games). Since the falter-
ing of Cuba's economy, the Cuban League began charging an admission fee for
games, whereas previously all games were free. See id. Additionally, Cuba's poor
economy makes transportation to baseball games difficult. See id.; see also Ben
Walker, Big League Baseball Returns to Cuba, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 27, 1999,
available in WL, APNEWS (explaining that a box seat ticket for a Cuban baseball
game now costs about 10¢, while the average monthly income in Cuba is about
$11). Creating a Cuban baseball fund that draws taxes from the contracts of MLB's
Cuban players can improve these conditions, and allow the Cuban people to enjoy
the baseball in Cuba, while rooting for their countrymen in MLB. See generally
Peter Bjarkman, Cuba: Four Decades, INT'L BASEBALL RUNDOWN, Sept. 1998, at
15 (reviewing the changing structure of the Cuban League, and describing that the
season stretches from early November to late April). Players that depart Cuba to
play in MLB could feasibly come back to Cuba to participate in the Cuban
League's season since the length of the respective seasons barely overlap. See id.
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Additionally, this tax can provide Castro the opportunity to redirect
funding previously earmarked for Cuban baseball2"' towards allevi-
ating the rampant conditions of poverty that plague the Cuban peo-
ple.2"
Enacting the policies of Baseball Diplomacy from First to Third
Base will decrease the incentives for Cuban players to follow the "El
Duque" model." 5 Moreover, the economic reasons for players to de-
fect will dissipate.46 Although some Cuban players may still seek to
immediately command lucrative contracts under the "El Duque"
model, most of the Cuban talent will still remain available to the
majority of MLB teams through the Draft.4 Such a draft system will
not eliminate the dichotomy between rich and poor teams. It will,
however, afford poorer teams access to Cuban players by allowing
them to scout, draft, and trade these players for greater financial and
competitive success. 24 Thus, a Cuban Draft and a tax on Cuban con-
Thus, Cuban players could assume a player-ambassador role by playing in the Cu-
ban League for their winter baseball assignments from MLB.
243. See Robb, supra note 83, at C4 (discussing the defection of Arocha, and the
favorable treatment afforded to Cuban players by the Castro government). Roberto
Valdes Perez, sports director for the Cuban town of Regla, said that the Cuban
government provides higher salaries and special treatment that begins at age eight
for Cuban baseball players. See id.
244. See Hernandez, supra note 3, at A24 (describing the poor economic condi-
tions within Cuba).
245. See supra notes 124-132 and accompanying text (discussing the "El
Duque" model and its appeal to Cuban baseball players).
246. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (conveying the reasons be-
hind the defections of Cuban baseball players).
247. See supra notes 108-133 and accompanying text (concluding that adher-
ence to the "El Duque" model can result in large free-agent contracts prior to com-
peting in MLB). By contrast, the Baseball Diplomacy proposals will enable Cuban
players to gain the possibility of a large free agent contract after six seasons in
MLB. See Kohm, Jr., supra note 2, at 1253 (asserting that players can achieve free
agency after six years of service with the same team, and can improve their con-
tracts through salary arbitration). Moreover, Baseball Diplomacy permits Cuban
baseball players to directly move to the United States to play MLB, as opposed to
the circuitous path of the "El Duque" model, which requires establishing residency
in a third country. See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text (asserting that
for the "El Duque" model to work, it requires establishing residency in a third na-
tion other than Cuba and the United States).
248. See supra notes 137-142, 145-147 and accompanying text (detailing the
conditions that make it difficult for poor MLB teams to compete). Baseball Diplo-
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tracts supporting the Cuban baseball infrastructure will assist the
struggling economies of both MLB and Cuban baseball, and will en-
able Baseball Diplomacy to safely move to Third Base.
D. HOME PLATE: CHANGING UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION LAWS
These changes by MLB and Cuba, however, will not succeed un-
less efforts begin at home. The United States must change its immi-
gration policies to look beyond the current Cuban communist gov-
ernment, and instead seek to reach out to the Cuban people through
baseball. 249 Prior to the enactment of the Helms-Burton Act250 and the
establishment of the "El Duque" model, New York Congressman
Jose Serrano first introduced legislation designed to permit Cuban
baseball players to play in the United States. In the 106' Congress,
macy will attempt to rectify these problems. See supra notes 227-247 and accom-
panying text. The first three steps of Baseball Diplomacy seek to rectify MLB's
competitive imbalance. See id.
249. See Wasem, supra note 74 (detailing the CAA, and indicating the United
States' willingness to absorb Cuban defectors); see also supra note 121 (detailing
the United States' efforts to allow Cubans to legally migrate to the United States);
Where Are We Heading?, supra note 9, at 2-5 (statement of Michael Ranneberger)
(discussing the United States policies of maintaining pressure on the Cuban gov-
ernment for democratic changes, seeking to promote contacts between the people
of the two nations, and working with the Castro government in migration and law
enforcement issues). But see supra notes 3, 11 (discussing the vociferous Cuban-
American opposition to any efforts to change the United States policy towards
Cuba as long as Castro remains in power). See generally Douglas Farah, Cuba
Wages A Lonesome Drug War: Congressional Stance Hampers U.S. Role, WASH.
POST, May 25, 1999, at Al (detailing Cuba's efforts to prevent drug trafficking,
and Congressional resistance to cooperate with the Castro regime in the war
against drugs). Despite efforts by Barry McCaffrey, the Clinton Administration's
director of national drug control policy, and pleas from the Department of Justice,
the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Coast Guard, Congressional oppo-
sition prevents any greater coordination between the United States and Cuba in
stemming drug trafficking through Cuba. See Id.
250. See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 sec.
102, 22 U.S.C. sec. 6032 (1996) ("Helms-Burton Act") (enacting a policy towards
Cuba that seeks to strengthen international sanctions against the Castro govern-
ment). The Helms-Burton Act also seeks to assist a democratic Cuba. See id. at
sec. 201, 22 U.S.C. 6061. Additionally, it endeavors to protect the property rights
of United States nationals. See id. at sec. 301, 22 U.S.C. 301.
251. See H.R. 9, 105th Cong. sec. 1 (a)(1)(1997) (providing the original lan-
guage of Serrano's legislation); see also Congressman Jose E. Serrano, Serrano's
Bill Would Open Doors WI Cuba Through Sports, NEWS RELEASE, Nov. 5, 1997
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this legislation, House Bill 262, remains before the House Subcom-
mittee on Immigration and Claims.-"2 Serrano based the aptly titled
"Baseball Diplomacy Act" on the ability of sports to unite people
from various backgrounds,2" and provides the impetus for an effec-
tive Baseball Diplomacy.
By passing such legislation, Congress will illustrate that the
United States no longer will force Cuban baseball players to defect in
order to compete in MLB. -" Moreover, passage of House Bill 262
will illustrate a dynamic approach to United States-Cuba policy by
increasing people-to-people contacts2" through baseball player im-
migration. Additionally, by permitting targeted modifications in the
application of the United States embargo to allow the immigration of
Cuban baseball players, House Bill 262 will not drastically depart
from the overall United States policy to pressure the Castro govern-
ment.2 6 Subsequent versions of Serrano's proposed legislation, how-
ever, should amend Section l(a)(1) to provide "O-1" or "P-i" visas
for Cuban players instead of the current language that calls for pro-
(discussing the original introduction of the legislation, and proclaiming the benefits
of Congressman Serrano's legislation).
252. See H.R. 262, 106th Cong. (1999). See generally H.R. 262, Detailed Leg-
islative Status, (visited Apr. 14, 1999) <http:f/thomas. loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdqu.. ./-bd8yaF:@@@L/bss/d106query.html> (explaining that on February
25, 1999, the Committee on International Relations referred H.R. 262 to the Sub-
committee on Immigration and Claims).
253. See H.R. 262, 106th Cong. (1999) (explaining that Serrano's legislation
seeks to engage Cubans through the beloved medium of baseball); see also supra
note 16 and accompanying text (describing the ability of sports in general, and
baseball in particular, to effectively unite people of different cultures).
254. See Bill to Allow Cubans to Play Without Defecting, BUFF. NEWS, Nov. 2,
1998, at 20S, available in LEXIS, News library (explaining that Serrano's legisla-
tion intends to enable Cuban players the chance to play in MLB without defecting).
255. See Where Are We Heading?, supra note 9, at 2-5 (statement of Michael
Ranneberger) (detailing the United States policy of promoting contacts between
the people of Cuba and the United States in an effort to cause a democratic transi-
tion within Cuba); see also id., supra note 9, at 11-12 (statement of the Honorable
Otto J. Reich) (calling for creative actions to directly communicate with the Cuban
people in an effort to both expose the abuses of the Cuban government, and liber-
ate the Cuban market for American businesses).
256. See supra note 225 and accompanying text (detailing the provisions within
the United States embargo against Cuba that require a modified application to
permit the immigration of Cuban baseball players).
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viding "H-2B" visas.257 Authorizing the appropriate "0" or "P" visas
for players and their families will diminish the difficulty of playing
in the United States, and will eliminate the need to defect.2 1 Fur-
thermore, allowing Cuban baseball players to receive "0" or "P" vi-
sas will allow these players to enter the United States the same way
as other foreign baseball players.5 9
Admittedly, preventing the Castro government from seizing the
salaries of these players may prove difficult. Undoubtedly, support-
ers and members of the Cuban-American lobby will seek to prevent
enactment of House Bill 262 because of their opposition to any inter-
action with Castro, and because of the possibility that the Cuban
President may benefit by seizing the player's salaries.2 ° Implement-
ing this legislation, however, will provide the first step towards al-
lowing a Draft that will display Cuban talent throughout MLB.261
Coupled with a tax on Cuban contracts that will support Cuban base-
ball, the incentives for seizing players' salaries will diminish.262
257. See H.R. 9, 105th Cong. sec. I(a)(1)(1997) (providing the original language
of Serrano's legislation); see also supra note 21 and accompanying text (explain-
ing the original application of "H-2B" visas for foreign athletes, and the modifica-
tions that permitted "0" and "P" visas).
258. See supra notes 23-49, 61-65 and accompanying text (discussing the appli-
cability of"O" and "P" visas for Cuban baseball players and their families).
259. See supra notes 19-49 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability
of the "0" and "P" visas for foreign baseball players).
260. See Kiger, supra note 3, at 76 (detailing the financial sway of CANF and
those involved with Cuban-American activities); see also supra note 11 and ac-
companying text (discussing CANF and Cuban-American opposition to Baseball
Diplomacy because of fears that it legitimizes the horrid human rights abuses of
the Castro government). But see Al Kamen, In The Loop: Diamonds Are A Pro-
test's Best Friend, WASH. POST, May 7, 1999, at A37 (asserting that Jose Carde-
nas, Washington director of CANF, attended the Orioles-Cuba game in Baltimore,
possibly signaling support for an effective Baseball Diplomacy that does not
strengthen the Castro regime).
261. See supra notes 229-234 and accompanying text (describing the proposal to
implement a draft of Cuban baseball players); see also supra note 225 and accom-
panying text (detailing the provisions of the United States embargo against Cuba
requiring modifications to enable the Second Base proposals of Baseball Diplo-
macy to take place).
262. See supra notes 236 and accompanying text (discussing the proposal to tax
the contracts of Cuban baseball players to provide funds for the Cuban League);
see also supra note 225 and accompanying text (examining the relevant provisions
of the United States embargo against Cuba requiring a modified application to en-
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Enacting the four proposals of Baseball Diplomacy requires strong
leadership, and a commitment to move around the Base-Path. MLB
Commissioner Bud Selig, and Presidents Castro and Clinton must
seize the opportunity to catch Baseball Diplomacy.2' Their efforts to
finalize the details of the Orioles-Cuban National Team exhibition
series indicates a potential willingness to try Baseball Diplomacy.2'
able the Third Base proposals of Baseball Diplomacy to occur).
263. See Reds hope to sign Quezada (last modified Feb. 8, 1999)
<http://espn.go.comtmlbnews/1999/990208/01093105.html> (explaining the
agreement between the Commissioners of American and Japanese baseball to al-
low the Cincinnati Reds to obtain negotiating rights to Alejandro Quezada). The
recent agreement signed in January by Commissioner Selig and the Japanese
Commissioner's office illustrates MLB's willingness to make international ar-
rangements to obtain the best international talent. See id. Prior to this agreement,
players in Japan that desired to play in MLB needed to retire from Japanese base-
ball, allow their Japanese team to release them, allow their Japanese team to sell
their rights to a MLB team, or qualify under Japan's rigorous requirements for free
agency. See id. See generally OrLx players to attend Al's camp, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Feb. 10, 1999, available in WL, APNEWS (detailing the agreement be-
tween MLB's Seattle Mariners and Japanese baseball's Orix Blue Wave to ex-
change players, front office personnel, and coaches for spring training, with the
eventual goal of playing exhibition games in both Japan and the United States).
The Mariners-Blue Wave agreement enables the Mariners, and their fans to enjoy
the play of some quality Japanese players. See id. Such an exchange, like the
aforementioned proposals for Cuban baseball immigration, functions to bring two
vastly different cultures together through their common language of baseball. See
id.
264. See Lawmakers ask Fehr to Block Games Against Cuba, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Feb. 4, 1999, available in WL, APNEWS (discussing the meeting of sev-
eral lawmakers with the head of the Baseball Players Union, Donald Fehr). Several
Members of Congress opposed the exhibition series on human rights grounds, ar-
guing that the series legitimized the Castro regime's terrible treatment of the Cu-
ban people. See id. These Members included Florida Republican Representatives
Diaz-Balart and Ros-Lehtinen, and New Jersey Democrat Menendez. See id. But
see Agent: Nicaragua, Costa Rica Offer Asylum to Baseball Defector's Group,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 6, 1998, available in WL, APNEWS (discussing Diaz-
Balart's efforts to obtain Nicaraguan residency for "El Duque," indicating his de-
sire to allow Cuban talent to compete in MLB, despite his opposition to the exhi-
bition series). See generally Matthews, supra note 14, at A8 (describing the White
House's efforts to bridge any discrepancies between the American and Cuban po-
sitions on how to direct proceeds from the proposed series). American officials
wanted Caritas, a Catholic charity, to receive the proceeds, whereas Cuban offi-
cials sought to have Cuban doctors acquire the money to help victims of Hurricane
Mitch. See id. A new American position emerged from a meeting between Na-
tional Security Advisor Samuel R. Berger and Baltimore Orioles owner Peter An-
gelos. See id. This position focussed on the United States' desire to send the pro-
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Despite the political and financial difficulties of organizing these ex-
hibition games,265 the series reaffirmed the ability to bring the Cuban
and American people closer together through baseball.266
CONCLUSION
Like good fundamental baseball, MLB, Cuba, and the United
States must move Base-by-Base to succeed. Each time one side de-
cides to move ninety feet to the next Base, the years of animosity and
the ninety miles separating Cuba and the United States begins to
fade. All three sides stand to gain from the aforementioned proposals
of Baseball Diplomacy. Baseball Diplomacy, though, is not a pana-
cea. These small steps will not bridge the ideological gap separating
a communist dictatorship from a democratic republic, 67 nor will they
allow the Montreal Expos to dethrone the New York Yankees.26 En-
ceeds to a cause that helps the Cuban people, as long as the money did not benefit
the Castro government. See id. See generally also Green, supra note 14 (explaining
that proceeds from the exhibition games benefited Cuban baseball and sports pro-
grams, but not the Cuban government).
265. See Mark Maske, 0's-Cuba Games Are In Doubt: U.S. Approval Seen Un-
likely for Proposal, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1999, at D6 (discussing the political op-
position in the United States to the exhibition series, and the contention over the
financial proceeds from the exhibition series); Jefferson Morley, Cubans Arrive
For 2"' Shot at Baseball Diplomacy, WASH. POST, May 3, 1999, at BI (asserting
that the United States' initial refusal to provide visas for certain government offi-
cials of the Cuban entourage led Cuba to broadcast an official communique stating
that the second game would be delayed or cancelled).
266. See Mark Maske, Baseball Mulls 0's-Cuba Games, WASH. POST, Jan. 6,
1999, at D2 (observing Angelos' desire to use the exhibition series as a medium to
bring the Cuban and American people closer together).
267. See Bernard W. Aronson & William D. Rogers, Special Report: U.S.-
Cuban Relations in the 21" Century, USIA COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS TASK
FORCE REPORT (visited Mar. 27, 1999) <http://www.usia.gov/regional/ar/us-
cuba/cfr.htm> (providing five separate "baskets" of recommendations designed to
promote United States policy in an effort to hasten the transition to a democratic
Cuba). These recommendations include: increased contacts between Cuban-
Americans and their families on the island; increased contacts between American
and Cuban citizens; extended humanitarian aid to Cubans; enhanced introduction
of United States economic activities within Cuba; and augmented cooperation re-
garding military and law enforcement matters. See id.
268. See Yankees Payroll Tops $85M, supra note 177 (indicating that the Expos
opened the season with the lowest payroll in 1999, while the World Champion
Yankees seek to defend their title with the highest payroll in MLB history).
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acting these policies, however, will act as a catalyst in that direction,
and allow the world's baseball fans to collectively cheer for the best
baseball available. Ultimately, such changes will insure a true World
Series each October.
